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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the current study was to compare the effect of conflict experience on 
sociopolitical attitudes, emotions and identity shifts of young people in two cities in the 
Donetsk province under Ukrainian governmental control. While the first city 
Kramatorsk fell under separatist control during the outbreak of the armed conflict in the 
East of Ukraine in 2014, the situation in the second one, Bakhmut, stayed largely calm.  
The different experiences of conflict of the informants were presumed to have had an 
impact on their perceptions. Hence, this project examined the attitudes of young people 
in these two cities towards Ukraine and its nationalising policies, the political elites in 
the Ukrainian capital, the separatist movement and towards political and cultural 
affiliations to Russia. 
Material for the in-depth examination consisted of 7 focus groups with overall 26 
participants (13 in each city) conducted in these cities in Spring 2017. Themes were 
generated in a bottom-up way in the course of the evaluation and analysis of the focus 
group transcripts, field notes from participant observation and conversations in the two 
selected cities. The theoretical framework for the analysis is based on a set of 
constructivist literature, including Brubaker’ triadic nexus (1995) and Fox’ and Miller-
Idriss’ concept of ‘everyday nationhood’ (2008). This research adds valuable qualitative 
insights to the existing literature on changes of identities, behaviour and attitudes of 
civilian population under the circumstances of armed conflicts. 
The research revealed, among other trends, that the more extreme the individual 
conflict-related experience of the focus group participants was, the less supportive 
seemed these focus group participants of DNR symbols and ideas. Additionally, the 
study results indicate that the focus group participants in Kramatorsk, who experienced 
the conflict stronger than most participants in Bakhmut, seemed to be more receptive to 
nationalising trends than their counterparts in Bakhmut – which indicates an impact of 
the experience of conflict on nationalising trends in the Ukrainian-controlled Donbas 
province.  
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A ‘Ukrainisation of Ukraine’ is what the Kyiv-based Peter Dickinson diagnoses in an 
op-ed article in the Atlantic Council. The demonstrations on Kyiv’s central Maidan, the 
ousting of Yanukovich, and the beginning of Russia’s hybrid war in 2014 led to ‘a 
national coming of age’, argues the British journalist. These developments are observed 
in the public spread of Ukrainian symbols, the ubiquitous national flag and 
vyshyvankas1 as well as a poll conducted by the Ukrainian Razumkov Centre (2017), 
which revealed that more than 90 percent of Ukrainian residents identify as ethnic 
Ukrainians (Dickinson, 2017).  
Many agree with this point. Regardless of Ukraine’s well-researched heterogeneity 
and its diverging political attitudes across the different regions in the country (Härtel, 
2016), numerous researchers argue that the current conflict in the East of Ukraine 
contributed to the ‘formation and consolidation of Ukrainian national identity in those 
regions where it was traditionally considered weak, i.e. across the south and east of the 
country’ (Gentile, 2017: 9).  
In a video debate with David Marples Taras Kuzio argues: ‘Conflict and war 
always changes identity very quickly […] and in the case of Ukraine, we can thank 
Vladimir Putin for doing it’ (Ukrainian Nationalism, Volhyn 1943, and 
Decommunization, 2017). Studies of identity in conflict, such as, by Voors et al.’s 
(2012) research on Burundi, Bellows’ and Miguel’s study on violence in Sierra Leone 
(2009) and Coupé and Obrizan on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (2016) revealed the 
impact that conflict or war-related experience have on attitudes, emotions or behaviour. 
This thesis will contribute to the study of populations affected by conflict-related 
violence. 
Being an ethnography-based qualitative research project this thesis complements 
the research on identity changes in the East of Ukraine methodologically. In contrast to 
the predominantly polls- and survey-based research it illustrates and analyses the reality 
of ‘ordinary people’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008) in two cities in the Donbas region, 
Kramatorsk and Bakhmut. By this, the research reveals possible tendencies of emotions 
and attitudes in these cities, and discusses their relation to the different experience of 
                                      
1 Ukrainian national costume 
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conflict. Overall this research project seeks to provide new analytical tools and insights 
for further research of war- and conflict-related changes of identities on the Ukrainian 
Donbas. Therefore, the main research question is: 
 
What impact does the different experience of conflict have on the attitudes and emotions 
of young people, raised in independent Ukraine and living in the cities of Kramatorsk 
and Bakhmut in the Donbas region, towards Ukraine and Russia? Does it affect their 
attitude towards Ukrainian political elites in the capital, towards nationalising policies, 
the separatist movement and towards their political and cultural affiliations to Russia? 
 
The rationale of this thesis is that a stronger experience of conflict has an impact on 
attitudes and emotions of young people and on how they relate to the aforementioned 
themes. In order to investigate how identities change under the circumstances of conflict 
and war, the researcher conducted fieldwork and ran focus groups in the two 
aforementioned cities in April and May 2017. 
Kramatorsk and Bakhmut are similarly sized, similarly industrially developed, with 
similar average income, but, in spite of their geographic proximity, the cities faced a 
different fate in the conflict. Although political legitimacy has been challenged by 
separatists and their supporters in both cities, the situation in Bakhmut remained largely 
calm. In contrast, between April and July 2014 Kramatorsk became a base for the ‘hard 
power of guns and fighters’ (Wilson, 2014: 132).  
The developments in the East of Ukraine were an unexpected shock to most 
scholars focusing on Ukraine and on countries of the former Soviet Union. Within a 
week from late February through the beginning of March 2014 Russia annexed the 
Crimean peninsula (Kofman et al., 2017: 1-10). Parallelly to this, Russian intelligence 
fomented violent riots in the Ukrainian Donbas region resulting in a cyclic dynamic of 
the Donbas-conflict from ‘political, irregular, hybrid, and conventional’ between 
February and August 2014 (ibid.: 69). As the Ukrainian government officially decided 
not to call the on-going ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in the East of Ukraine a ‘war’, I stick to 
the terminology of an ‘armed conflict in the East of Ukraine’.  
Though researchers largely agreed that the Donbas was in several ways different 
from the rest of Ukraine, nobody expected the outbreak of such a conflict. The academic 
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debates since the independence of Ukraine in 1991 did not discuss the possibility of 
clashes over separatism in Ukraine, but the compatibility of the ‘regional Donbas 
identity [...] with various forms of internal Ukrainian pluralism or civic identity’ 
(Wilson, 2016: 638). Through a qualitative approach, fieldwork and analysis of focus 
groups this research project investigated whether this ‘regional Donbas identity’ 
underwent significant changes since 2014. 
The first part of the thesis introduces the theoretical framework of the dissertation. 
After the discussion of social constructivism and Bourdieu’s influence on the perception 
of the researcher, a discussion and adjustment of the theoretical model of Brubaker’s 
‘triadic nexus’ (Brubaker, 1995) follows. This thesis presumes that Ukrainians with 
Ukrainian as a mother tongue across the country represent a supposed ‘core nation’, 
while the Russian speaking minority – or rather those, who speak Russian as the first 
mother tongue – are in the role of a constructed ‘national minority’, with Russia acting 
as an external ‘homeland’. 
After discussing Brubaker’s theory, an illustration of the socio-political background 
of the Donbas region follows. I elaborate on the peculiar Donbas borderland identity, its 
history and regional myths. In order to turn away from Brubaker’s elite-centred focus 
and discuss the theoretical reasoning for the choice of my focus group method and 
research participants, this research integrated Fox and Miller-Idriss’ theoretical 
assumptions on ‘everyday nationalism’ (2008). According to these authors the current 
research on construction of nation, national identity and nationalism neglects the 
perceptions of ‘ordinary people’ – those who by their routine actions and discussions 
essentially construct national identity (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008). The last theoretical 
subchapter deepens the discussion on the state of research on identities in conflict, 
followed by a formulation of assumptions, which are discussed in the empirical part. 
Concluding from the literature, the author presumes that the stronger experience of 
conflict leads to 
 
1) less support among the focus groups of DNR symbols and ideas, 
2) a stronger support of political elites in the capital, 
3) a stronger support of processes of nationalizing, such as an increasing spread of 
the Ukrainian language and national symbols 
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4) a more critical political stance towards Russia and an increasing feeling of 
cultural distance. 
 
The second chapter of the thesis elaborates on the methodology. In sum, the heart of my 
data consists of seven focus groups with 26 participants (13 in each city), my 
ethnographic field notes from various conversations and general observations from my 
stay in the Donbas. The set of prepared guiding questions2 aimed to initiate discussions 
about the two main topics in the independently conducted focus groups. They set the 
ground for the emergence of the analysed themes. Besides focusing on the discussion of 
the guiding questions, I gathered reactions, emotions and associations of the participants 
when confronted with five different symbols: the Ukrainian flag, the Russian flag, the 
DNR flag, the symbol of the nationalist volunteer battalion Azov, and the flag of the 
historical Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA], which is contemporarily used by the 
Ukrainian nationalist movement ‘Right Sector’ [Praviy Sector]. I presumed that 
symbols are relevant for this research, because, firstly, the Ukrainian government and 
patriotic volunteers invested a lot of effort in plastering the two researched cities with 
symbols of the country, and, secondly, because such ‘cultural ciphers’ elicit feelings and 
thoughts individuals associate with them (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 545). 
The sample of research participants includes youth, who did not go through the 
Soviet education system, do not know any ‘other homeland’ (Husyev, 2017) and for 
whom ‘there is nothing artificial about Ukrainian statehood’ (Dickinson, 2017). The age 
of the focus group participants ranged from 16 years to 34. 
In the fourth chapter, I illustrate, firstly, the background of the conflict in the east of 
Ukraine, and introduce the two cities on the basis of intensive research, interviews and 
ethnographic material. Consequently, I lead over to the analysis of themes, which 
emerged from the discussions in the focus groups in chapter five. I start with the 
analysis of the replies of my informants on the different experiences of conflict (5.1.). 
The different experiences of my research participants during the events in the East of 
Ukraine between February and August 2014 in these two cities are presumed to have 
had an impact on different attitudes towards the other themes. 
                                      
2 Appendix 1 
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In chapter five I compare the themes across the cases. I use quotes in the words of 
participants to illustrate their different perspectives. Resulting from the analysis of the 
focus group transcripts and a comprehensive evaluation of the data, I generated themes 
in a bottom-up way. I start with the analysis of informant replies on the different 
experiences of conflict. The different experiences in these two cities are presumed to 
have had an impact on different attitudes towards the following themes: the relation of 
research participants to the DNR, the current Ukrainian political elites which emerged 
during the Maidan revolution, the participant’s attitudes to Russia, politically and 
culturally, and the Ukrainian nationalising policy in the region.  
The discussion about the informants’ experience of conflict in 2014 in many cases 
automatically led my participants to reflect on their and of their surroundings relation 
towards the DNR in 2014 (5.2.) and now (5.3.). A major finding of this section is that 
the more extreme the individual experience of conflict-related clashes personally was, 
the less supportive seem the focus group participants of DNR symbols and ideas.  
The next subchapter (5.4.) is dedicated to the complicated and multi-layered 
relation of my focus group participants to Russia. The paradoxical relationship became 
most evident in their reactions to the Russian flag, which turned out to be more 
controversially discussed in Kramatorsk than in Bakhmut.  
Following from the discussion of my informants’ relationship to Russia I lead over 
to a discussion of their general mistrust towards political elites – locally and nationally 
(5.5.). The final empirical subchapter illustrates the different trends in the way 
‘nationalising’ policies by the Ukrainian government in the cultural and linguistic 
spheres are perceived. This section reveals that the focus group participants in 
Kramatorsk and those in Bakhmut, whose experiences were strikingly similar to the 
informants in Kramatorsk, seemed to be more receptive to nationalising trends than 
their counterparts in Bakhmut – which indicates an impact of the experience of conflict 






Figure 1: Provincial borderlines of the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces (Wilson, 2014: 119) 
 
 
Figure 2: Frontline borders in the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces (liveuamap, 22.08.2017)  
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2. Theoretical discussion 
  
 12 
2.1. Investigating multiple realities: Social Constructivism 
This thesis stands in the tradition of social constructivism. This theoretical paradigm 
presumes that the manner of the discourse constructs the way people perceive reality, 
and that empirical research and theories constitute each other continuously. In this view, 
the ‘object’ of study is not naturally given in an ‘objective reality’, but constructed by 
various actors in a ‘research interaction’ (Aronoff and Kubik, 2013: 26). Hence, social 
constructivists investigate the interplay, variety and intricacy of different and possibly 
mutually exclusive views instead of narrowing the understanding to generalised 
categories. They try to comprehend their cases by using a variety of theories through 
‘interpretive techniques’ and ‘bridging’ their observations with reflections on their own 
positionality in the field (Creswell, 2007: 20f.). 
This research project deals with the interpretation and relation of social agents to 
symbols, nations and identity. It lies within the broader research on collective and 
national identity, nations and nationalism (e.g. Mole, 2007: 5). In the constructivist view 
nations as much as the other entities, are ‘politically contested and historically 
contingent social constructs’ rather than ‘natural and enduring givens’ (Fox and Miller-
Idriss, 2008: 549). 
 
2.2. World through the lens of Bourdieu 
Theories and methodological assumptions of Pierre Bourdieu shaped my perception of 
the world as ‘a fluid social construction with structured, structuring and symbolic 
structures’ (Costa, 2014), as much as my reflexive gaze during the fieldwork. As it is 
typical for Bourdieu-inspired research, I worked with an ‘eclectic mix of methods’, 
adjusted it over the course of my fieldwork and rejected any ‘constraints of 
methodological orthodoxy’ (Evans, 2016). 
Bourdieu uses the term habitus to emphasise that agents are constituted through the 
interplay of history, norms, education, family and other socioeconomic factors. The past 
structure of the field under study, crucial in the understanding of the habitus at present, 
is illustrated through a literature-based overview on the Ukrainian Donbas before 2014 
and after the outbreak of the conflict. The historical and political developments are 
gradually ‘embedded’ in the habitus of the people in the region. To sum up, this 
literature overview sets the basis for understanding the historical formation of habitus. 
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Theoretically, habitus is conceptualised as a system of subjective but not individual 
dispositions, in which ‘structuring structures [are] predisposed to function as structuring 
structures’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 53; Bourdieu, 2013: 72). It is an accumulated past and 
present internalised and shared by agents of a particular group in a distinctive region 
(Bourdieu, 1976: 165-188). People acquire these dispositions over their lives, through 
socialisation. Hence, the habitus of a group is shaped in the context of social relations, 
‘by interactions within concrete social networks’ (Crossley, 2008: 93). Thus, for 
Bourdieu no action can be detached from the conditions of the habitus. The incorporated 
past experiences – not only by the agent, but also by his or her environment and 
particularly his or her family – function as a lens for action, perceptions and thoughts 
(Bourdieu, 1976: 169). 
The basis of this research project is the analysis of the rich and complex empirical 
material with some references to ‘thinking tools’ (Grenfell, 2008: 2) by Pierre Bourdieu, 
rather than an extensive methodological application of his theory. Instead of limiting 
this research project on a set of fixed tools, the Bourdieusian lens inspired the action of 
the researcher during the fieldwork and helped gathering valuable insights on how 
different experience of conflict shapes people, their thoughts and identity – and, thereby, 
to some extent their habitus (Wilson, 2016: 636). 
 
2.3 . Theorising the borderland: Ukraine as a ‘nationalising state’, 
its Russian speakers in the Donbas and their alleged homeland 
 
Neither Ukraine, nor Rus, 
I fear you Donbas, I fear you. 
 
[Ne Ukraina i ne Rus 
boius, Donbas, tebia boius, from Nikolai Domovitov, cited by Kuromiya, 2015: 5] 
 
This thesis situates the analysis of the field close to Brubaker‘s triadic nexus. In his 
seminal work Brubaker conceptualises the triangular relations between a ‘nationalising 
state’, a ‘national minority’ and (imagined) external national ‘homelands’ (Brubaker, 
1995:108). Brubaker perceives these three groups as engaged in an interrelational 
struggle: 
1. the elites of a domestic ‘nationalising state’, of an alleged ‘core nation’, bolster 
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‘the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, and political 
hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation’ (Brubaker, 1995:109) 
2. the (constructed) national minorities resist the elites of the nationalising state, 
and call for autonomy within the ‘nationalising state’ 
3. external ‘homelands’ allegedly seek to protect ‘their’ ethnic minorities as a 
result of a ‘sense of shared nationhood across political boundaries’ (Kuzio, 2001: 
137). 
 
According to Brubaker this triadic nexus is applicable to the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, such as Ukraine, because of the legacy of a ‘distinctive Soviet system of 
institutionalized multi-nationality’ and the way the ‘centralized rule and state-wide 
economic integration had led to linguistic and demographic Russification’ (Brubaker, 
2011: 1787). His conceptualisation gives us further analytical tools to understand the 
relations in the Ukrainian Donbas region. 
Following Brubaker, this thesis presumes that Ukrainians with Ukrainian as a 
mother tongue (not necessarily the only mother tongue though) across the country are 
the ‘core nation’, while the Russian speaking minority – those who speak Russian as the 
first mother tongue – are in the role of a constructed ‘national minority’, with Russia as 
an external ‘homeland state’. This does not imply, however, that I perceive the Russian 
speakers in the Donbas as a real ‘ethnic’ minority, nor as supposedly ‘less’ Ukrainian 
than people with a Ukrainian mother tongue. Yet in the role of the constructed ‘external 
homeland’ Russia claims to defend its supposedly ‘co-ethnics across the border’ against 
potential discrimination by Ukraine (Clem, 2014: 230). These relations became crucial 
with the beginning of the conflict in 2014, when Russia’s president Vladimir Putin 
‘portrayed his country’s role in Ukraine as safeguarding ethnic Russians worried by 
lawlessness spreading east from the capital’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). 
I point out that I did not categorise the Russian-speaking population in the Donbas 
in relation to Russia out of political reasoning, but firstly, because of the relevance of 
geographic proximity (e.g. Pop-Eleches, 2007: 909). Secondly, the categorisation 
seemed accurate, because plenty of research participants in both examined cities 
claimed their connection to Russia by their either still persisting strong family ties or by 
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emphasising that the ethnic background of the whole Donbas region – as a ‘settled 
region’ – is connected to Russia. This kind of historical memory, irrespective of 
whether it is based on facts or not, is an important pillar for strengthening of any kind of 
identity (Smith, 1991; Polegkyi, 2015: 170). 
 
2.4. The Donbas as a land of freedom, terror, and dynamic 
interaction 
In the Donbas the internalisation of history – particularly of myths surrounding Soviet 
and regional identities – and identification with an ethnically mixed population, merged 
into a regional, ‘borderland identity between Russian and Ukrainian’ (Wilson, 2014: 
638). Kuromiya describes this borderland region as an imagined community (Anderson, 
2006), which ‘lived up to its reputations of freedom and terror’ (1998: 4). The Donbas 
became both famous and infamous as a ‘land of freedom’ for outlaws and refugees of 
various ethnicities, fleeing from political persecution or economic difficulties (Wilson, 
1995: 267; Kuromiya, 2015: 2). As a strategically important area in both the Russian 
empire and the Soviet Union, the Donbas continuously required labour force willing to 
commit to hard and dangerous industrial labour in the extractive economy. This 
commitment was glorified in the Soviet Propaganda when mine workers were lavished 
with honours. Urbanisation accompanied this fast economic development. Heavy 
industrialisation started around 1860s (Wilson, 1995: 279) and was actively subsidised 
with international investments from Western Europe since the 1880s (Balaban et al., 
2017: 20). The Donbas became an ethnic melting pot, where diverse groups mutually 
constituted each other. ‘Interaction’ in a literal as well as in the constructivist sense was 
the natural reality. 
In contrast to the history of freedom, stands the legacy of terror. Thousands of 
Donbas inhabitants were imprisoned during the Stalinist terror in the 1930s (Kuromiya, 
1993: 217). In addition, the rural population of Eastern Ukraine starved to death on a 
large scale during the famine following Stalin’s forceful collectivisation in 1932-1933. 
This crisis is mourned in Ukraine as the Holodomor (Snyder, 2010: chapter 1). After the 
murderous depopulation of the area, mainly Russian settlers were moved to these lands 
to fill the labour gap. Wilson states that the ‘region’s pre-Soviet Cossack-agricultural 
history died with the Holodomor’ (2016: 636). 
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With the increasing influx of Russian speakers after the thirties and World War II 
(WWII), the influence of Russian language and culture increased. Russification led to a 
restriction of access to ‘Ukrainian schools, mass media and culture’ (Wilson, 1995: 275). 
While most of schooling was in Ukrainian language during the interwar period, the 
number of Ukrainian language schools declined steadily since the 1950s. Social realities 
and language education shifted towards Russification. In 1933 more than 60 per cent of 
pupils were still studying in Ukrainian in the Donbas. In 1989, two years before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and in a time when ethnic identifications were more related 
to the choice of the language spoken, more than 60 percent of Donbas inhabitants 
declared Russian as their ‘native tongue’ (Wilson, 1995: 267). 
It is notable, however, that it was not forbidden to educate the children in Ukrainian 
since the end of the 1950s. The number of nominal Russian speakers increased also 
because local Ukrainians tended to send their children to Russian speaking schools even 
if they were not coerced to do so (Wilson, 1995: 275). During the Soviet time, acquiring 
Russian skills became a valuable form of ‘symbolic capital’ (Riabchuk, 2009; Balaban 
et al., 2017: 23; Moore, 2008: 103-106), as Russian was the dominant language in the 
Soviet Union (Smith, 2013: 220f.). The devaluation of this capital with the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union led the Ukrainian government to encourage the spread of Ukrainian 
school curricula. The increase happened, however, not to the same extent in all regions 
of Ukraine: while the school education in Ukraine was almost exclusively in Ukrainian 
in the West and the centre of the country by 2011, Russian still dominated the curricula 
in the East and Southeast of Ukraine (Brubaker, 2011: 1800). 
Reflecting on the historical legacies of the region and based on my observations 
during the fieldwork, I stick to the terminology of ‘Russian speakers’ instead of ‘ethnic 
Russians’ used by scholars like Clem when applying Brubaker’s theory (2014: 230). 
The first reason is that various polls indicate a constant change of identity alignments in 
Ukraine since 1989. Increasingly, people who formerly identified as ethnic Russians 
tend to identify as ethnic Ukrainians (Brubaker, 2011: 1793). The second reason lies in 
the changing number of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine particularly over the time of the 
current conflict since 2014. The increase from 86 percent of people in Ukrainian 
identifying as ‘ethnic Ukrainians’ up to 92 percent in 2017 is too high to be explained 
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solely by a demographic shift within Ukraine due to the conflict (Razumkov Centre, 
2017). 
Thirdly, many research participants, who were native Russian speakers, did not 
identify ethnically as simply ‘Russian’: the answers in the distributed questionnaires3  
ranged from Russian, Ukrainian, Ukrainian and Russian to even Slavic. These 
ambiguous ‘mixed and fluctuating identities are characteristic of borderland populations’ 
(Brubakers, 2011: 1793). As I will illustrate later, the relevance of history, family and 
cultural ties to Russia does not necessarily reflect the political stances of my participants 
towards their supposed ‘external homeland’. 
Though the minority might fluctuate in their political and cultural alignment, it 
remains crucial for an external ‘homeland’ that ‘political or cultural elites’ claim the 
belonging to the same nation regardless of national borders. According to triadic nexus 
the national minority is torn between the ‘two antagonistic nationalisms’: on the one 
hand, the country perceived as a ‘homeland’ and, on the other, the country the minority 
is settled in (Brubaker, 1995: 108f.). The ‘external homeland’ seeks to intervene into the 
relations between the national minority and their ‘new homeland’. As soon as the 
minority feels that their identity is threatened by the majority, the interrelational 
structure can lead the minority to actively seek support from the ‘external homeland’ 
and the ‘homeland’ to take action by any means (Brubaker, 1995: 110). 
Brubaker emphasises that the perception of external ‘homeland’ does not 
necessarily need to be based on any family-based or historical connection of the 
minority. Thus, ’”Homeland” is a political, not an ethnographic category; homelands 
are constructed, not given’ (Brubaker, 1995: 110). By this, Brubaker’s notion of 
homelands, resembles Anderson’s definition of nations as ‘imagined communities’, in 
which ‘members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion’ (Anderson, 2006: 6-7). Nonetheless, actors construct a common 
history and culture as a representation of the self and as a tool for political agency. 
These constructed narratives are continuously produced, reproduced, and adjusted. They 
                                      
3 all research participants were asked to fill in a short questionnaire about them and their family. The 
questionnaire can be found in appendix 2. 
 18 
are not static, and change in line with political developments and sociopolitical 
discourses (Hall, 2003). 
The character of Brubaker’s model of interrelational field comes close to 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of dynamic fields. Brubaker argues that his all three fields, 
the national minority, perceived homeland and nationalising country, are intertwined. 
Within the fields ‘an arena of struggle among competing stances’ exists (Brubaker, 
1995: 118). Bourdieu conceptualises his field as an amalgam of objective historical 
relations, based on peculiar forms of power embodied in capital. This means that history 
and experience of the agents in the field structure and are structured by the field. The 
capital relevant in the field is in turn embodied in the habitus of the agents. A common 
comparison to illustrate Bourdieu’s field concept are playing fields. Every playing field 
has its own rules, goals of the agents, conflicts and relevant resources to win the game 
played on the field. The agent’s actions, success or failure in the playing field depends 
on their resources (or ‘capital’) and the habitus (Fuchs-Heinritz and König, 2011: 140-
145; Thomson, 2008). 
Both Brubaker and Bourdieu assume that these fields not only represent a base for 
homogenous groups or actors, but are also playgrounds for the struggle of various actors. 
In Bourdieu’s notion agents, who have internalised a feel for the rules, seek to keep or 
to accumulate capital relevant for the field or to manipulate the rules to their advantage 
(Fuchs-Heinritz and König, 2011: 145-149). In Brubaker’s case, this struggle means, on 
the one hand, mobilising supposedly ethnic kin against the supposedly host state, which 
is often depicted as ‘nationally oppressive’ (Brubaker, 1995: 118). On the other hand, 
Brubaker infers that the struggle within the field might be inverted by presenting, in the 
present case, Ukraine as the only real motherland instead of the oppressive nationalising 
state – as many of my informants did. In their view, the ‘external homeland’ Russia is 
now the oppressive state, intervening into the territory of their ‘new’ home country.  
Thus, Brubaker’s and Bourdieu’s theoretical models, with their different angles on 
societal dynamics, provided complementary thinking tools at different stages of this 
research, and illuminated the complex interrelational struggles in the field of the 
‘national minority’. 
However, the application of Brubaker’s theory is cautious and limited because of 
the following reasons. Firstly, according to Kuzio, the terms ‘nationalist, nationalism 
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and nationalising’ might be too blurry for the Ukrainian case. He argues that Brubaker 
classifies policy as nationalist arbitrarily. Nationalising policies – often referred to as 
Ukrainisation – in Ukraine, for instance, can be simply perceived as ‘nation building’ 
(Kuzio, 2001: 140). However, this peculiar nation building can be still discussed from 
various stances, it can have nationalist elements – and certainly does in the field of 
memory politics (see Kulyk, 2017). The nationalising policy promoting the Ukrainian 
language (ibid.) evoked heated discussions in the two cities researched.  
Secondly, Brubaker’s elite-centred concept directs the attention away from the 
analysis of voices and dynamics on the ground. While Brubaker criticises the ‘dyadic’ 
analyses for depicting the minority torn between two states as apathic (Brubaker, 1995: 
123) and emphasises their agency within its field, he neglects, the positions, agency and 
perceptions of the ‘ordinary people’. He presumes them to be just recipients of 
nationalist ideas, which elites impose on them. The reality in Donbas – particularly 
since the beginning of the conflict in 2014 – is more complex. Roles of elites are 
sometimes overstated, sometimes understated, and their effect on the people varies 
strikingly. Thus, Brubaker overlooks the dynamics of ‘everyday nationalism’ (Fox and 
Miller-Idriss, 2008) to which people living in such a border area as the Donbas are 
exposed to, and neglects the ‘synergy between local and translocal dynamics’ (Polese, 
forthcoming: 162). 
 
2.5. Looking at the ‘ordinary people’ 
To avoid Brubaker’s elite-centrism, this research integrates Fox and Miller-Idriss’ 
assumptions on ‘everyday nationalism’ (2008). They reverse the elite-centred trend in 
current research on national identity and nationalism by studying reflections of 
‘ordinary people’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 538-542). Fox and Miller-Idriss identify 
the ‘nation as a discursive construct’, which is ‘embodied, expressed and sometimes 
performed’ in the daily lives of social agents, namely the ‘ordinary people’ (ibid.: 537-
542). The authors agree that nation- as well as nationalism-building is actively pursued 
by elites through ‘standardizing, universalizing, bureaucratizing and culturally 
indoctrinating processes’ (ibid.: 549). They add, however, that this does not say much 
about the reception, interpretation and realisation of this input by social agents. 
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Similarly, Polese analyses how identity was reproduced and performed daily in 
Ukraine during the Orange revolution. He investigates how identity questions were 
challenged ‘at the daily and then national level’ (Polese, forthcoming: 162). Though he 
alludes to the impact that this revolution had for the social interplay between Ukrainians 
from East and West of the country, his research neglects the East Ukrainian scepticism 
towards the Orange revolution. His ethnographic article was, nevertheless, inspiring as 
it put emphasis on the issues of ‘language attitudes, political activism and perception of 
the other (Russia)’ – themes I also discussed with my focus group participants. Thus, 
this research follows Polese, Fox and Miller-Idriss in their conviction that ‘nation 
building can be conceived, performed and engaged in with by people or organizations of 
people’ (Polese, forthcoming: 163). 
 
2.6. Identities in conflict 
The conflict in Ukraine is one of the most recent and still ongoing conflicts, which 
provides a unique opportunity to research how conflict affects identity in real time. By 
this, the thesis is in a dialogue with authors like Bellows and Miguel (2009), who 
examined how the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) affected the political 
participation of the people. Those participants of their study, who were directly exposed 
to war experiences, had a higher voting turnout and were more likely to be more 
socially and politically active. In another research project Voors et al. found out that in 
Burundi those people, who experienced cruelty themselves, tended to behave more 
altruistically than those, who did not experience it (2012). 
In the context of recent conflict-related literature on Ukraine, the study of Coupé 
and Obrizan researched a similar subject. The authors analysed perceptions of people in 
Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, two cities which were both severely hit by the conflict in 
the East of Ukraine (2016: 201). Coupé and Obrizan researched the effect of ‘personally 
experiencing the consequences of violence on political participation, views and 
knowledge, using individual level data from the conflict in Eastern Ukraine’ (Coupé and 
Obrizan, 2016: 201). Their study revealed stronger support for pro-Western parties 
among people who personally experienced conflict-related actions than among those 
who did not. Their findings indicated that those affected by property damage seemed 
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less likely to compromise with Russia as a solution to the conflict and less supportive of 
‘keeping Donbas a part of Ukraine’ (Coupé and Obrizan, 2016: 210). 
A recent study by the Berlin-based institute ZOiS (Sasse, 2017) is more similar to 
this thesis project. Using surveys the researchers investigated how the ongoing conflict 
in the East of Ukraine affected the identities and attitudes of people living on both sides 
of the contact line. Regardless of the deadlocked situation between the conflict parties, 
the study revealed that people stayed in touch with each other beyond the frontline. It 
illustrated that on both side of the frontline people think more similarly than previous 
research had suggested. For instance, around 14 percent on the government controlled 
side and around 20 percent in the currently occupied territories became increasingly 
convinced that due to the conflict they identify as both Russian and Ukrainian (Sasse, 
2017: 1). 
In the ZOiS study the majority of the survey participants identified Russian as their 
native language, roughly 50 percent in the Ukrainian controlled Donbas and about 60 
percent in the DNR or LNR (Sasse, 2017: 7). In addition to these 50 percent, more than 
thirty percent on both sides confirmed a ‘bilingual identity’ with both Russian and 
Ukrainian languages as their mother tongues (ibid.). Besides these points, the survey 
results indicate identity shifts on the Ukrainian controlled side of the Donbas over the 
last five years, changing from stronger identification as a ‘Ukrainian citizen’ five years 
ago to a higher importance of a Ukrainian ethnic identity or a regional Donbas identity 
more recently (Sasse, 2017: 6f.). 
This thesis complements the previously reviewed literature on identity in conflicts 
and particularly in the East of Ukraine with a different methodological stance. In 
contrast to Coupé, Obrizan, and Sasse, rather than focusing on the examination of polls 
and surveys this thesis investigates the changing of attitudes and identity affiliations in 
the Donbas by employing a qualitative analysis in a dynamic focus group environment. 
Topics were introduced by the researcher during these group talks, and resulted in 
different emerging themes induced by the research participants. By this, the research 
revealed the ‘basic interests of respondents.’ Such qualitative approach facilitated a 
more comprehensive understanding of the fluidity of opinions (Herbst, 1992: 221). 
A further distinctive feature of this research project is its inspiration by a 
comparative model. The researcher analysed similarities and differences in two cities, 
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whose political control was contested in 2014, but which are again under full control of 
the Ukrainian government. The population of these cities was, however, exposed to 
strikingly different experiences in 2014. The next chapter is dedicated to methodology, 
which helped me to answer the following research question: 
 
What impact does the different experience of conflict have on the attitudes and 
emotions of young people, raised in independent Ukraine and living in the cities of 
Kramatorsk and Bakhmut in the Donbas region, towards Ukraine and Russia? Does it 
affect their attitude towards Ukrainian political elites in the capital, towards 
nationalising policies, the separatist movement and towards their political and cultural 
affiliations to Russia?  
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3. Research Design: Qualitative Analysis inspired by a 
comparative method 
 
This thesis is qualitative and inspired by a most similar system design with a small n-
case study. Most similar system designs are common in social sciences and particularly 
in the field of area studies, where it is often required to point out and explain differences 
in research objects (such as countries or cities) while illustrating and controlling the 
commonalities of them. This research investigates the different perceptions in two 
industrial, similarly located, sized cities in the Ukrainian controlled Donbas, where most 
inhabitants experienced the conflict in 2014 differently. The cities of Bakhmut and 
Kramatorsk are the cases analysed. 
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3.1. Case Study research 
Case study research is defined by Creswell as ‘a qualitative approach in which the 
investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases), 
through detailed, in-depth data collection’ (2007: 73). Gathering evidence for qualitative 
studies is, to put it with Gerring and Creswell, ‘naturalistic (a “real-life context”)’, based 
on holistic assumptions (Gerring, 2007: 94). Therefore, qualitative research enables 
examining a holistic picture of a research object, focusing on ‘the world of lived 
experience’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 8). The researcher becomes the ‘key instrument’ 
for collecting data in the field, observing researching participants in their natural 
environment, and listening to stories of ‘silenced voices’. Instead of limiting the study 
on ‘cause-and-effect relationships’, qualitative researchers investigate various 
perspectives on a situation, illuminating a larger picture (Creswell, 2007: 36-40). 
During the process of my qualitative research, I reflected on my positionality in the 
field and sought to interpret ‘phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 3). To illustrate this, I use quotes in the words of 
participants. Resulting from the evaluation and analysis of the focus groups transcripts, 
field notes from participant observation and conversations in the two selected cities, I 
generated themes in a bottom-up way. The data was categorised in the phase of analysis 
into ‘more abstract units of information’ (Creswell, 2007: 39f.). I remained open for 
adjustments of the research and guiding questions, and flexible for new participants for 
my study over the process of fieldwork. The collected data was systemised through the 
qualitative software Nvivo. During the coding process, I developed a system of codes 
and categories (‘nodes’), and derived the examined themes, making the analysis a 
bottom-up process. Strength of this case study comparison lies in its application of 
multiple methods to investigate ‘ordinary people’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008) located 
in two cities of the same region. 
From the review of the existing literature on identity in conflict and particularly on 
the conflict in the East of Ukraine, I cautiously generated the following assumptions 





The stronger the experience of conflict personally was 
• the less supportive are the focus group participants of DNR symbols and ideas. 
Thereby, the focus groups in Kramatorsk should show a weaker support for 
DNR than the groups in Bakhmut. 
• the more supportive is the perception of elites in the capital. Thereby, the focus 
groups in Kramatorsk should show a higher support of the elites in Kyiv than the 
groups in Bakhmut. 
• the more supportive are the focus group participants of processes of 
nationalizing, such as an increasing spread of the Ukrainian language and 
national symbols. Thereby, the focus groups in Kramatorsk should show a 
higher support for these kind of policies than the groups in Bakhmut. 
• the more critical are the focus group participants of Russia politically and 
distanced culturally. Thereby, the focus groups in Kramatorsk should be more 
critical of Russia’s politics and culture than the groups in Bakhmut. 
 
3.2. Ethnographically inspired research 
The epistemological assumptions discussed in the theoretical part are put into practice 
using ethnographically inspired research methods. By conducting the focus groups, 
talking to participants before and after the groups, and taking field notes, I tried to 
reduce the distance between me and my research subjects (Creswell, 2007: 18). During 
the days I spend in the cities, I tried to get a feeling for the places I have been to and to 
investigate information about them, which were difficult to acquire before, such as 
average income in the cities. 
Ethnography as a method is typically ‘used to study culture (meaning systems) or 
other aspects of the broadly conceived social, such as economy, power (politics), or 
social structure’ (Aronoff and Kubik, 2013: 27f.). Crucial method of ethnographic 
research is participant observation. Consequently, this thesis is the written outcome 





The basis of this study consists of seven focus groups with the total of 26 participants, a 
background interview with one of the participants in Bakhmut, and field notes from 
participant observation in the analysed cities between 22nd April and 9th May 2017. 
Four focus groups were conducted in Kramatorsk and three in Bakhmut. As the 
experience of conflict of internally displaced people is expected to be entirely different 
to city inhabitants without the experience of displacement, this analysis excluded them 
from the research. All focus groups were conducted in Russian and lasted between one 
and two hours. All participants of the focus groups were recruited via snowball 
sampling with the help of the intermediary Ulyana Egorova, who works for the 
organisation ‘Responsible Citizens’ [Otvetstvennye Grazhdane]. 
The chosen sampling method is a typical method for recruiting people for such 
sensitive research topics. Due to Ulyana’s regular work-related trips over the whole 
(Ukrainian government-controlled) Donbas area, I gained access to a diverse network of 
people from different strata of the society, with different educational and social 
backgrounds and various political views and experiences. By gaining access to Ulyana’s 
broad local networks I avoided ‘capturing a biased subset’, a common problem with 
snowball sampling (Morgan, 2008: 816). 
I chose to analyse youth groups, who did not go through the Soviet education 
system to minimise the impact this might have had on personal development of people. 
The age of my participants ranged from 16 years to 34. Authors like Yuriy Husyev, 
former Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2015-2016) emphasise the different 
generational beliefs, sets of values and notions that divide the Ukrainian society. 
Husyev depicts the generation born in 1980s and 1990s as the first one that does not 
know any ‘other homeland’ and who feel more committed to the Ukrainian state 
(Husyev, 2017). 
From a Bourdieusian point of view, however, the impact of the parent and even 
grandparent generation might be bigger than Husyev assumes. As mentioned before the 
habitus of the people is constituted by the environment, societal structures and families 
they are raised in (Bourdieu, 2013: 72-76). Being aware of this, I tried to gather mostly 
young people, who were 1) raised in the cities I chose as my cases and 2) whose parents 
were socialised in the Donbas region. With the Bourdieusan relevance of family 
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influence in mind, I expected to get a more representative picture of the regional youth. 
This made the focus groups I examined by default diverse enough to have a more 
representative sample for the cities, but still homogenous enough to enable fruitful 
discussions without possible discriminative factors such as a supposedly unequal 
relationship between the participants based on age difference. 
 
3.4. Focus Groups 
In relation to my research question I sought to investigate the youth groups in a dynamic 
social research environment. Focus groups are interactive by definition. On a broad 
level, they can be defined as ‘collective conversations or group interviews’ (Kamberelis 
and Dimitriadis, 2005: 887). The particular ‘interaction’ in a focus group setting enables 
a contextualisation of ‘historical and cultural settings of the participants’ (Creswell, 
2007: 21) and reveals valuable insights on the social discourse and dynamics in which 
opinions are brought up. On the one hand, this dynamic disclose ‘unarticulated norms 
and normative assumptions’ of the research participants, but also their ‘particular 
memories, positions, ideologies, practices and desires’ (Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 
2005: 902-904). 
Fox and Miller-Idriss recommend this ‘dialogic, and democratic practice’ method 
(Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2005: 887) for ‘capturing variation in the nuance and 
texture of everyday nationhood’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 555). They argue that the 
method of focus groups is useful to grasp the reproduction of nation and nationhood, 
which is elicited ’through talk and interaction’ and by ‘performing the nation’ (Fox and 
Miller-Idriss, 2008: 537-542). Their argument is in line with Bourdieu-affiliated 
researchers like Pouilot who argue that focus groups minimise the impact of the 
behaviour of the interviewer on the research situation. Besides that, a focus group, with 
its ‘non-discursive forms’ and bodily expressions during the exercise, can be treated as 
a performance itself (Pouilot, 2013: 54; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 555). 
Before I arrived in Kramatorsk, I communicated with Ulyana extensively over 
social media about my research and about the desired sample. Over the time of the 
fieldwork, I discussed all my concerns with her, and adjusted the research process in 
accordance with the development of my fieldwork. Almost all of the focus groups were 
conducted in cosy café environments in Kramatorsk and Bakhmut.  
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Research adjustments to the initial plan included the number of participants. 
Initially, I planned to conduct four focus groups with five participants each. During the 
first focus group on the 23rd April one participant, who did confirm his attendance 
before, did not show up. Instances of people being late or needing to leave early were 
common and are common when applying this method (Barbour, 2005: 45). For these 
reasons, the number of participants in the focus groups ranged from two participants to 
maximum six. During one focus group in Bakhmut the unplanned participant was from 
a different settlement then the city under research. In spite of his ‘difference’ I decided 
to keep him in my sample, to see whether his attendance might trigger interesting 
comparisons in the group. 
The set of prepared guiding questions aimed to initiate discussions about the two 
main topics and set the ground for the emergence of further themes. In the course of the 
group talk, I asked the participants what they associate with five different symbols: the 
Ukrainian flag, the Russian flag, the DNR flag, the symbol of the nationalist volunteer 
battalion Azov, and the flag of the historical Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA], which is 
nowadays used by the Ukrainian nationalist movement ‘Right Sector’ [Pravii Sektor]. I 
presumed that symbols are relevant for this research, because, firstly, the Ukrainian 
government and patriotic volunteers invested a lot of effort in plastering the two 
researched cities with symbols of the country, and, secondly, because such ‘cultural 
ciphers’ elicit feelings and thoughts individuals associate with them (Fox and Miller-
Idriss, 2008: 545). It seemed clear that the nationalising ‘Ukrainisation’ policy initiated 
by the post-Maidan political elites in the capital sought to establish ‘nation, or people 
[...] one with their state’ by enhancing ‘the promotion of standardized languages, 
national (and nationalist) educational curricula’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 536f.). 
Hence, I discussed with the participants their relationship to these symbols, the changes 
in the city since the beginning of the conflict, their personal experiences and identity-
related thoughts, emotions and reflections. To complement information and gain 
relevant information about the family background of informants at the start of every 
focus group, I distributed a questionnaire gathering some basic demographic data4. 
All the focus groups were recorded on audio files, with the consent of all 
participants. The audio recorder was clearly visible in all situations of the research. I 
                                      
4 You will find a sample of this questionnaire as appendix 2 attached to this thesis 
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moved the cassette recorder from place to place, but usually at some point the group 
members just took over this task, and started passing it to each other. This increased the 
interactive element of the work. I would take some notes, but did it in a way so that all 
participants could see what I was writing down. From the feedback I received after 
some focus groups I can judge that such openness increased the level of trust between 
me and the participants. 
A danger of focus group research on such sensitive topics might be potential self-
censorship by group participants. I tried to neutralise this by working as transparently as 
possible and emphasising that, firstly, the information will be anonymised and, secondly, 
I am not there to judge anyone. I was there to listen and told them that I appreciate 
every opinion. The only thing that I requested was that they respect each other opinions 
the same way I do it. By the last phrase, I tried to prevent people censoring themselves 
because of other participants. In addition to that, Ulyana introduced me and my research 
project. Because of the snowball sample, she was familiar with at least one participant 
in every focus group. This facilitated the process of trust-building, as most of the people 
perceived her as an open person. Over the course of the focus groups all participants 
stayed respectful, even when they disagreed on various points. Because people living in 
the same cities often experienced similar events – though in some cases from different 
angles – they could mostly relate to each other and complement each other’s 
experiences during the group talks. 
 
3.5. Ethical and axiological considerations 
The anonymity and security of the research participants remained the highest priority of 
that research. The sensitivity of the topic caused understandable suspicion among some 
of the focus group participants. I sought to be as open with the research participants as 
possible and to inform them about the character of the project they participate in. All 
participants supported the project voluntarily (Christians, 2005: 144f.). Overall, I think I 
could dissolve this suspicion in most of the cases – also due to the excellent assistance 
of Ulyana or longer conversations I had with some individuals before the actual focus 
group. 
Being aware that qualitative research is ‘value-laden and that biases are present’ 
(Creswell, 2007: 17f.), I tried to minimise them by reflecting on them and trying to 
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distance myself from political alignments or judgemental behaviour as much as possible. 
As I pointed out, I focused on the words of the participants more than on my 
interpretation of them. When I entered the field for my research in the Donbas, I was 
politically convinced that I support the Maidan revolution, and democratic change in 
Ukraine. I was aware, however, that my opinion is not shared by everyone in the cities. 
I also came to realise that participants have different notions of various terms, 
‘democratic change’ is only one example. Hence, over the time of the research I avoided 
own political contributions to discussions to avoid a ‘spiral of silence’ (Noelle-
Neumann, 1980), in which people avoid contributions out of the fear of social isolation 
or judgemental treatment by me as a researcher.  
3.6. Positionality of the researcher 
I reflected on my positionality as a researcher in the field and the impact my social 
situation might have for the research. As qualitative research is based on an examination 
of what researchers ‘see, hear, and understand’ (Creswell 2007: 39), I acknowledge that 
my personal background, my ‘cultural, and historical experiences’ inevitably impact not 
only my views but also how people perceive me in the field. Hence, I adhere to the 
notion that the reality I am describing and analysing is ‘filtered through my lenses of 
language, gender, social class, race and ethnicity’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 6). I 
reflected on the power relations in the field between me and the participants of the study, 
created by economic, educational, institutional inequality and already by the simple fact 
that since 2004 I have the German citizenship. 
My family emigrated from Russia and Ukraine to Germany in 1991, when I was 
five months old. Though I was raised in Germany, I learned Russian at home as the first 
language in my childhood. My family has a Ukrainian-Jewish background. My parents 
were born and raised in Ukraine. Over the course of this research I realised that my (at 
least) bicultural background and the fluency in a Russian working class sociolect 
significantly facilitated access to, research and communication in the Donbas. 
Theoretically speaking, the proficiency in this Russian sociolect turned out to be a 
valuable symbolic capital (Riabchuk, 2009; Moore, 2008: 103-106), in the sense of 
Bourdieu, which eased access and communication with the local population in these 
predominantly working class cities.  
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3.7. Emotional Involvement 
While I was preparing for the fieldwork, I reflected on possible emotional involvement 
while researching in a conflict or conflict-affected area. Even though I was aware that 
full ‘neutrality on the researcher’s part is practically unachievable’ (Malyutina, 
forthcoming), I tried to stay as politically and emotionally distant as possible. I did 
expect, prior going to these cities, to hear breath-taking conflict-related stories. In such 
cases, the strategy I prepared proved to be useful: When I spotted emotional 
involvement, I accepted these feelings – but postponed dealing with them after I exit the 
field. Following this strategy, I tried to keep my field notes as neutral as possible, 
remained in the constant awareness of the inequality of power between me as a 
researcher and the participants in which I cannot avoid representing ‘university-based 
authority’ while undertaking fieldwork in a ‘local community’ (Christians, 2005: 146). 
These reflections, the psychological strategy and the short period of the fieldwork made 
me as far from an insider as possible, while it still enabled me to shed light on the 
conflict-affected participants in the East of Ukraine and to make their reality visible 
(Helbardt et al., 2010: 349). 
The following chapter illustrates and introduces the background of the conflict, and 
provides largely ethnographic descriptions of both cities.  
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4.1. Igniting the fire: Background on the conflict in the East of 
Ukraine 
In the end of November 2013 former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych decided 
against signing the Association Agreement with the European Union in the framework 
of its Eastern Partnership programme. This decision sparked mass protests on Kyiv’s 
Independence Square [Maidan Nezalezhnosti], better known as simply ‘Maidan‘. 
Demonstrations and the reaction by the government escalated violently and lead to the 
removal of Yanukovich from office in February 2014. Together with some close 
political allies Yanukovich escaped to Russia (Clem, 2014: 219). From a Russian 
political perspective, the following takeover of the political power by a quickly 
consolidated pro-Western interim government was considered a sudden loss of political 
and economic leverage in one of its most relevant neighbour countries (Kofman et al., 
2017: 1). 
The immediate Russian reaction was to initiate two military operations to regain 
strategic influence over Ukraine again. Within a week from late February through the 
beginning of March 2014 Russia seized control of Crimea by invasion, occupation and 
finally annexation of the peninsula (Kofman et al., 2017: 1-10). Parallel to the 
developments in Crimea, Russian intelligence incited violent riots in the East of Ukraine 
resulting in a cyclic dynamic of the Donbas-conflict from ‘political, irregular, hybrid, 
and conventional’in the period of February to August 2014 (ibid.: 69). 
Military action in both cases was accompanied by severe mass propaganda 
campaign in Russian media outlets. Kofman et al. emphasise that the Russian 
disinformation attempts – targeting not only Ukrainian audiences, but also the domestic 
Russian audience and Russian speakers worldwide – had (and still have) three crucial 
goals: ‘discrediting the new government in Ukraine, emphasizing the grave danger to 
Russians in Ukraine, and ensuring the display of broad support for Crimea’s ‘return 
home’ to the safety of Russia’ (Kofman et al., 2017: 13). 
The Russian media propaganda in 2014, however, took advantage of severe 
political mistakes by the Ukrainian government, such as the abolition of the special 
status of the Russian language. This and similar political decisions fuelled the anxiety of 
Russian speakers in the East of Ukraine, increased their mistrust and eased the 
preparation of a fruitful ground for ‘a rapid and well-coordinated deployment of Russian 
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forces’ (ibid.: xii). 
In the shadow of the ubiquitous anxiety and insecurity about the political 
developments in Kyiv, dubious figures, mostly with a criminal background or criminal 
ties appointed themselves as ‘people’s mayors’ and ‘people’s governors’. The Ukrainian 
government neglected the internal dynamics in the Donbas region as well as the well- 
researched divisions of the country (e.g. Rodgers, 2006; Wilson, 2015) and condemned 
the protests in this region as deliberate Russian provocations. Though Russian 
intelligence, individuals with imperialist beliefs and propagandists may have played a 
significant role in fuelling the public anger in the beginning of the protests, however, 
the vexation and public uproar in the East of Ukraine were real and most of the 
demonstrators locals (Kofman et al., 2017: 33-34). 
However, Russia supported the Ukrainian riots through their intertwined oligarchic, 
business and criminal networks in the Donbas, with intelligence agents, and an informal 
network of former combatants from previous wars in the post-Soviet space. Russian 
tactics seemed to support and employ a variety of individuals, who were only unified in 
their hostility towards the new Ukrainian government, such as mercenary soldiers, 
nationalists and paramilitaries (ibid.: 38-40). Instead of a coordinated operation 
pursuing strategic political goals, ‘Russia invested in a mess’ (ibid.: 67). 
Armed separatists captured administration buildings all over East Ukraine from 6th 
April to 23rd April. The city halls of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk were seized on 12th 
April. Police forces in the cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, Slovyansk and Kramatorsk were 
either afraid of the separatists or deserted to them. The Ukrainian army was puzzled and 
overstrained with the situation and clueless about how to tackle the separatists and their 
civilian supporters (ibid.: 40f.). 
The conflict dynamic can be seen with the help of Brubaker’s previously discussed 
model. Vast part of the Russian speaking ‘minority’ felt under threat – regardless of 
whether the threat was real or not – by the political takeover of representatives of the 
supposed Ukrainian ‘core nation’, and their looming nationalising policies. With the 
beginning of the Russian annexation of Crimea, Russia deliberately presented itself as 
an ‘external homeland state’, defending its supposedly ‘co-ethnics across the border’ 
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against potential discrimination by Ukraine (Clem, 2014: 230; Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2014). 
Instead of framing the conflict as a war, the Ukrainian interim government signed a 
declaration starting the so-called anti-terrorist operation in the East of Ukraine (Balaban 
et al., 2017: 35; ZN.UA, 2014). By choosing this terminology, Ukraine remained 
eligible for continuous reception of international economic assistance (Yekelchyk, 2015: 
151). Most people I talked to in Kramatorsk, however, seemed rather skeptical towards 
the term ‘anti-terrorist operation’: 
• FG4-Аf: They are saying, this is not war. That this is just a conflict, terrorist acts 
and so on. But I do not know, what is war then if this is not war?5 
During spring 2014, the positions of the various involved individuals and groups 
swayed between a federalisation of Ukraine or a full secession with the goal to join 
Russia (Kofman et al., 2017: 40). Former key figures of the separatist movement, such 
as Igor Girkin [nom de guerre: Strelkov] for instance, counted on a Russian military 
invasion in the Donbas similarly to the Crimean annexation. As illustrated in the 
empirical chapter, various focus group participants confirmed that the hope for a 
Crimean scenario fomented the public support in the cities for separatist rebels. 
In the beginning of July the fights in the north of the Donetsk region escalated 
again. In the course of these fights, the groups around Girkin withdrew their fighters 
from cities like Slovyansk, Kramatorsk and Artemivsk/Bakhmut for the city of Donetsk 
(Balaban et al., 2017: 39). Not long after this withdrawal, Girkin and other ideologically 
minded key figures of this phase of the conflict were removed from their offices by 
Russia by summer 2014. The think tank RAND Corporation concludes that Russia 
‘clearly had other plans and sought to avoid an overt military invasion’ as these figures 
expected it (Kofman et al., 2017: 67). 
                                      
5 At the start of every focus group, I would sketch the seating on an extra sheet of paper and allocated 
a Latin letter to every person in the focus group: A, B, C, D, E, G, and one time I used the letter X for a 
person, who was more then half an hour late. This procedure sought to strictly anonymise the data of all 
participants. According to these codes, I constructed the names of the participants in the empirical part. 
The first letter stands for the city (B for Bakhmut, K for Kramatorsk), the second part tells the number of 
the focus group in this city (FG1 to FG4), the third part stands for the allocated letter in the group (A, B, 
C, D, E, G, X) and the small letter at the end for the gender of the participant (m for male, f for female). 
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After a major blow to the Ukrainian army in the city of Debaltseve in February 
2015 – around 100 kilometres away from Kramatorsk and less than 60 kilometers away 
from Bakhmut – on the 12th February the Ukrainian government signed the Minsk II 
agreement. According to this agreement, the Ukrainian government accepted, among 
other points, to grant a special status for the separatist regions, to change the 
constitution by implementing crucial decentralisation reforms, and regulating release 
and exchange ‘of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons’ (bpb, 2015). 
At the time of the fieldwork and during the research for this thesis, the conflict was 
in a cyclical phase, with some irregular peaks of fights, such as in winter and spring 
2016 (Kofman et al., 2017: 41). Meanwhile, the separatist territories were undergoing a 
structural consolidation. Russia supports with troops, weapons and intelligence the 
transformation of the separatist fighters into a regular army (ibid.: 45).  
Since the beginning of the conflict, the whole Donbas region struggles with a 
humanitarian crisis, such as of a significant deterioration of living conditions, shrinkage 
of industrial production, surge of criminality, and a high number of internally displaced 
persons (Balaban et al., 2017: 45f.). This will be also taken into account in the following 
section, when I will introduce the two analysed cities. This descriptive part will be a 
compilation of research on the cities and my ethnographic material, as well as 
interviews in the cities or material gathered in the focus groups.  
 
4.2. Kramatorsk – the ‘West-Berlin of the Donbas’? 
Kramatorsk is an industrial city, where most of the cityscape is characterized by 
Khrushchyovkas, these concrete-paneled five-storied apartment buildings, developed in 
the USSR during the 1960s. I was struck by the overabundant patriotic decorations. 
Playgrounds, graffitis, various walls and even some trees in the city were painted in the 
colours of the Ukrainian flag, in blue and yellow. 
As most of the focus groups were conducted in the early evenings, I spent time 
during the day walking and observing people. Most people, regardless of their age, class 
or educational background speak a regional dialect called surzhyk here. It is essentially 
Russian with a Ukrainian pronunciation or Ukrainian words (Rodgers, 2006: 162). The 
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predominant number of working class people in this city seem to use surzhyk not only 
as a dialect, but also with elements of a sociolect, such as a simple syntax, and a 
common use of swear words. I observed various groups of young people, mainly boys, 
entering kiosks and using ‘bliad ́’ [Russian swear word, something like ‘bitch’] as a fill 
word in almost every sentence. 
Another striking factor is the ubiquitous alcohol consumption in the town. Starting 
from around 3:30 pm every day groups of men, mostly coming from the factories in the 
city, start crowding in pubs and restaurants to drink. They order bread or snacks and 100 
gram of Cognac or Vodka. When I was looking for a restaurant to have my lunch, a guy 
approached me, approximately 40. ‘It is not worth going there’, he told me. ‘You won’t 
get anything to drink there before 5 o’ clock.’ 
Parallels of this ubiquitous working class habitus can be drawn to Paul Willis’ 
famous study of working class boys in Britain. In this seminal study Willis analysed 
social dynamics in boys group and depicted how class behaviour and career paths were 
reproduced in a working class town in England, where ‘the overwhelming majority of 
the population are [employed] in some form of manual work’ (Willis, 1977: 6). 
Similar structures as depicted by Willis seem to be prevalent in Kramatorsk in 
2017. From the end of the 19th century Kramatorsk became one of Ukraine’s focal 
centres ‘for the manufacture of heavy machinery and machine tools for the 
metallurgical, mining, power, and chemical industries’ (Campbell, 2008a). The main 
manufacturer producing heavy mining and metallurgy equipment in this city now is 
‘New Kramatorsk Machinebuilding Factory’, abbreviated NKMZ [Novokramatorskii 
Mashinostroitelnyi Zavod]. Most of the people in the city work for this factory, which 
the focus group participants often referred to as the ‘breadwinner’ of the city. 
• KFG4-Аf: [...] people moved here from Russia and worked for the factories. When 
NKMZ was built, people started building small villages around NKMZ, this 
became a township […], and then it grew to a city. 
Some workers working for this manufacture told me proudly that NKMZ did not close 
down for a single day since the end of the German occupation of the city in WWII. 
Thus, it did not only continue working during the armed conflict in 2014, but 
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additionally supported its employees financially, and provided shelter during shelling in 
the early evenings and even over nights. 
• FG4-Bm: The salaries were paid, our boss was supporting us in every way and 
even paying extra money, in addition to the salary. 
• FG4-Am: Employees [...] were even staying over night in the factory sometimes. 
Because it has bomb shelters. Because it was scary to get home and even scary to 
stay at home. 
Though this city can be described as a middle-sized city with its roughly 160,000 
inhabitants, many people here depict it as rather provincial. Locals emphasise that the 
town gained its importance only with the beginning of the conflict. KFG4-Af, a woman 
born and raised in Kramatorsk, said: 
• KFG4-Af: When my grandma was watching the news, and they were mentioning 
some Ukrainian cities, I was always puzzled: Why is nobody talking about our 
city? I love this city so much. Is there really nothing happening here which is worth 
mentioning? Since 2014 I understood that it would have been better, if the name of 
the city remained unmentioned. 
This quote illustrates how the conflict in the East of Ukraine changed the relevance of 
this formerly unremarkable city. Wilson contrasts the role of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk 
in 2014, where ‘the hard power of guns and fighters was based’, to the role of Donetsk, 
headquarter of the ‘agents provocateurs, Putin’s tourists and paid demonstrators’, in 
short ‘the soft power’ of the DNR (Wilson, 2014: 132). Kramatorsk was under the 
control of pro-Russian rebels for three months, until the Ukrainian army reconquered 
the city in July 2014 (Brunner, 2016). 
Since the Ukrainian military reconquered this city, the central administration of the 
Donetsk Oblast was relocated from the city of Donetsk to Kramatorsk. Following these 
developments, national and international organisations started relocating their offices to 
this city as well, the Ukrainian government and international donors started investing in 
the development of the city. KFG4-Аf comments on these developments with a proverb: 
‘If you do not have fortune, misfortune can help as well.’ 
In interviews with journalists the vice-governor of Kramatorsk Jevgenii Vilinskii 
proudly depicted Kramatorsk as the ‘West-Berlin of the Donbas’, referring to the 
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isolated half of Berlin during the Cold War (Brunner, 2016; Seiler, 2017). In this time, 
the Federal Republic of Germany subsidised the development of Berlin heavily, aiming 
to show its systemic superiority towards East-Berlin, the capital of the German 
Democratic Republic. Analogically, Kramatorsk is now subsidised by the Ukrainian 
government to prove its superiority towards the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s 
Republic’ (DNR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LNR). 
Since 2015, the mayor of Kramatorsk is Andrii Viktorovich Pankov. In 2017 he is 
listed as an independent candidate (Kramatorsk City Council (Official Website), 2017). 
Yet according to the 2010 local parliament data from 2010, he was member of the Party 
of Regions and their leading candidate in 2010, the same year Yanukovich won the 
position as a president (Central electoral committee of Ukraine, n.d.,a). Dominance of 
the Party of Regions is typical for the East of Ukraine and it developed from the 
working class background of the Donetsk and Luhansk region and the sociopolitical 
dynamics here during the transition period in the 1990s (Kuzio, 2015:181; Wilson, 2007; 
Carroll, 2014). Regardless of the demise of the Party of Regions following the ousting 
of president Yanukovich in 2014, both analysed cities exemplify strong political 
continuities with similar key figures in charge as during Yanukovich’s last presidency. 
 
Besides the increasing national and international attention on the city, the trauma 
and supposedly shifted political and identity alignments investigated in this research, 
the conflict brought economic problems to the inhabitants of Kramatorsk. The flow of 
people, not only expats working for international organisations, but also internally 
displaced people from the DNR and LNR territories caused a skyrocketing of rent prices 
in this city. 
According to information I gathered average income per month stagnates between 
100 to 200 Euro in Kramatorsk as well as in Bakhmut. These figures are gathered by 
talking to various informants, people on the streets as well as by conversations to NGO 
employees during the participant observation. At the time of the fieldwork the currency 
exchange fluctuated between 28-30 Hrivna equating 1 Euro (hence income varied 
between 3000-5000 Hrivna). It was rather difficult to determine average income, 
because tax enforcement is fairly low and the persisting informal sector of income 
flourished since 2014 even more. As a typical example of apparent informal trends, the 
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central market in Kramatorsk is often crowded by elderly people selling flowers, fruits, 
vegetables from their gardens by which they subsidize their low pensions. An average 
pension in both analysed cities is between 50 to 60 Euro a month. KFG2-Cm illustrated 
the economic relevance of these informal markets for his family during the DNR rule in 
the city in 2014: 
KFG2-Cm: […] It was only three of us, me, my grandma and my aunt. And a huge garden 
[laughing], which needed to be managed. Thanks to this garden we survived. 
During the day, a lot of elderly women sat in front of the entrances of the 
khrushchyovkas. On one day I sat down next to a group of six old ladies. One of them 
asked the other one whether she knew a good place to have some coffee in Kramatorsk, 
‘as mild as the coffee in Moscow’. Another one sarcastically replied: ‘Shush, or people 
will think you are a separatist!’ Reactions like this hint to a general feeling of insecurity 
and mistrust towards each other in the society. During the conversation, I asked these 
women about their experience of conflict. ‘It was terrible! We hid wherever we could, 
ran into our cellars, did not sleep, and what for? We live now worse than in Africa, on 
ranking number 134!’ 
According to the data of the CIA World Fact Book Ukraine ranks 148th of 230 
countries overall in terms of GDP per capita (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). The 
Legatum Prosperity Index 2016 lists Ukraine on rank 107 out of 149 countries, with 
ranking 134th on the sub-category of ‘safety and security’ (Legatum Institute, 2016). As 
evident from the conversation with the elderly women and the observations on the 
ground, not only the ongoing armed conflict has a strong impact on the perception of 
the people, but also the ongoing humanitarian crisis. ‘The West-Berlin of the Donbas’ is 
far from the prosperity West-Berlin experienced while being heavily subsidised by the 
economically and politically stable (West-)German government during the Cold War. 
Vice-governor of Kramatorsk Jevgenii Vilinskii does not consider the situation of the 
‘ordinary people’. 
4.3. Bakhmut – A master and his protégés 
The master of Bakhmut, mayor Alexei Alexandrovich Reva is a local legend. He holds 
his position since 1994 (Politrada, n.d.) and various informants told me that he and his 
family are connected to the majority of businesses in the city, and completely 
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dominating the political sphere in Bakhmut. Not even the armed clashes in 2014 in this 
region could oust the former member of Yanukovich’s Party of Regions from office – 
he managed to agree with the rebels to leave the city quietly in July 2014. The local 
population, his protégés, seem grateful. 
As mentioned in the previous section on Kramatorsk, both Reva in Bakhmut and 
Pankov in Kramatorsk with their former affiliation to the Party of Regions follow a 
regional trend. In 2010, 48 of 52 members of the local parliament in Bakhmut were 
members of this party (Central electoral committee of Ukraine, n.d., b). The successor 
party ‘Oppositional Bloc’ won almost 74 percent of the votes in the local elections in 
2015 in this city (Bakhmut.com.ua, 2015b). 
Wilson describes the Party of Regions as a ‘clientelistic and authoritarian 
organisation’, which ‘reward[s] its friends and punish[es] its enemies’ (Wilson, 2007). 
It successfully merged legacies of ‘left-wing paternalism Soviet nostalgia, and big 
businesses’, while being able to ‘neutralise’ political and economic opponents by 
defeating or absorbing them into the own political scheme (Kuzio, 2015: 177). Reva can 
be identified as a typical outcome of these regional networks, a local ‘patron’ in this 
city, who transformed his political power ‘into access to final resources for patronage 
and clientelism’ (Kuzio, 2015: 177). He and his family run the city entirely. 
I stayed in Bakhmut during the first week of May 2017. Similarly to Kramatorsk, 
Bakhmut has a history of industrialisation, it is known for its ‘production of non-ferrous 
metals’ and famous in Ukraine for the so-called Artemivsk Salt mines (Campbell, 
2008b). Artemivsk was the former name of the city until the local parliament decided in 
September 2015 – in line with the Ukrainian laws of decommunisation – to change the 
name to the city’s historical name Bakhmut (Bakhmut.com.ua, 2015a). 
Four things seemed significantly different from Kramatorsk. Firstly, though 
patriotic graffiti, flags and signs were almost as prevalent in the cityscape as in 
Kramatorsk, the city looked quite differently overall. From an architectural perspective, 
it was way less covered with Khrushchyovkas, but presented a more eclectic mixture of 
buildings from various centuries. Secondly, less drinking men were present on the 
streets at four pm, overall everything seemed more neat than in Kramatorsk. 
 42 
Thirdly, the city was much more difficult to reach. The city is surrounded by 
checkpoints. In comparison to the rather well-connected Kramatorsk, it was more 
difficult to travel to Bakhmut and even more difficult to leave it. The last busses and 
trains were leaving the city around six pm every day. The elderly woman who rented 
out her flat to me commented on this by calling the city an ‘abandoned territory’. 
With its roughly 80,000 people the city is smaller than Kramatorsk. It might be 
home to a couple of thousand more people now, as the demographic structure of the city 
changed during the armed conflict in the region. Many internally displaced persons 
moved to Bakhmut from the currently occupied territories (Novosti Donbassa, 2017a) 
and not everyone registers at new place of residence in Ukraine. My local landlord 
mentioned that plenty of people living in DNR and LNR commute to Bakhmut once a 
month to get their Ukrainian pensions, which might require registration in this city as 
well. 
Additionally, the numerous soldiers in this city – who are also significantly more 
prevalent in the public space than in Kramatorsk – could have also contributed to an 
unofficial surge of the population. During my fieldwork I ran into a volunteer working 
for an NGO in Bakhmut. He told me that people feel both secure and insecure by the 
large presence of the soldiers at the same time. On the one hand, they feel defended by 
them, but on the other hand, plenty of them feel tense seeing new soldiers, from which 
they initially do not know what to expect. Focus group participants and this NGO 
worker explained that particularly in the beginning of the conflict many locals 
witnessed different kinds of misbehaviour by soldiers, starting with strong alcoholism to 
various kinds of (mostly drunk) harassments of civilians. 
This leads over to the fourth difference to Kramatorsk: It was more difficult to 
recruit participants for my study in Bakhmut than in Kramatorsk. Less people were 
willing to talk about the conflict and the situation in the city. Overall, it was more 
difficult to approach people in the city and to talk about any kind of topics considered 
sensitive. In many cases my initial attempts to communicate with locals were met with 
suspicion because of my foreignness and led to subsequent avoidance. My intermediary 
Ulyana had similar experiences in the city while helping me to find suitable participants 
for the focus groups. BFG2-Cm emphasised during a conversation before the focus 
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group that 
in these times it is better to stay neutral. This is the reason why nobody here wants to 
talk about politics. They do not know who they are dealing with und who might be in 
power soon. 
During the focus group BFG2-Cm reiterated his point by stating: ‘Do not trust anyone.’ 
His habitus, behaviour and way of communication seemed to suit the working class 
characteristics described in the ethnographic part about Kramatorsk. He had both a 
stronger surzhyk dialect and a sociolect, signified by a massive use of swear words. By 
slightly adapting my own way of speaking to his way, I managed to gain his trust over a 
couple of hours before the focus group and to weaken his hesitation to talk to me about 
sensitive topics. This seemed to have accelerated the dynamics in the focus group later. 
He was actively passing the audio-recorder during the focus group and trying to involve 
other people in the group. All of them were either his acquaintances, his family or close 
friends. During our conversations before, however, as well as during the focus group 
later he stayed strikingly nervous about the audio recorder and confronted me with his 
assumption that I might be a spy. In my particular case this suspicion was also related to 
a class-related lack of experience with both university institutions and academics. On 
my reply that I am just a sociologist, he said: ‘I don’t know what this is. For me, you are 
a spy.’ 
It is significant for this research to illustrate the role Bakhmut’s mayor Reva played 
during the armed conflict, especially during the attempted takeover of Bakhmut – back 
then Artemivsk – by the pro-Russian rebels. The city was barely affected by any violent 
clashes, but the DNR flag was unobtrusively installed in Bakhmut on 12th April 2014. 
The law enforcement authorities of the cities neither supported nor impeded the action. 
The mayor accepted the flag at the city council and officially depicted it as a 
‘compromise’ to prevent a violent takeover of the city as it happened in various 
neighbouring cities. When a journalist asked him why he did not put up a flag of 
Ukraine next to the DNR flag, Reva replied: ‘What is more important: a flag or peace in 
the city?’ (Bakhmut.com.ua, 2014). 
To get a better picture about his role during the conflict, I asked the focus group 
participants about him. Almost no one was really enthusiastic about him, but people 
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respected him for two things. In the first place, they appreciate his role in preventing 
larger violent clashes in Bakhmut in 2014 – the striking difference to Kramatorsk and 
the reason why I chose to compare these two cities. 
• BFG2-Еm: I am 95 percent certain that he reached an agreement, because he is 
a… master [Khoziaistvennik]. 
 
• BFG2-Cm: Rumours started to spread that he was paying both sides [in the 
conflict] so that everything stays calm on the territory of Artemivsk, no military 
clashes. 
 
• BFG3-Аm: I mean, he was somehow sponsoring DNR. At the beginning. Then, at 
some point, the DNR fighters moved from Artemivsk to Debaltseve. […] Now he 
just continues working and is, currently, on the side of Ukraine. 
 
BFG2-Cm also mentioned in an interview before the focus group that other people 
involved in businesses in the city had applied the same strategy to keep their business 
running. They tried to prevent ‘fights or change of power’ in the city. 
Secondly, Reva is appreciated for maintaining law and order in the city [poriadok] 
and a picture of a prosperous city, with the development of playgrounds and parks. The 
corruption allegations he is facing (Novosti Donbassa, 2017b; vesti-ukr.com, 2017) are 
perceived either as normal or as a necessary evil. Overall, he is seen as a successful 
master [khoziain or Khoziaistvennik] of the city. 
 
• FG2-Df: So let him [Reva] rob. But the city develops. 
 
• FG2-Еm: He is the only mayor, who did not change a single time in Ukraine, since 
the end of the Soviet Union. […] He is like a good running car, which does not get 
old. It drives, works, everyone benefits. 
  
• FG3-Вm: He is a master. Fully into business, whole sphere of services, brought all 
kind of services under his control and under the control of his family. In general, 
the city is not bad. Some things are built, something is developing […]. 
 
Economic priorities like ‘development of the city’ are not new to this region and were 
saturated by the Party of Regions before 2014. Electorate in the Donetsk and Luhansk 
Oblast was known for prioritising strong and clearly defined hierarchical structures with 
a strong ‘patron’ guaranteeing political and economic developments, and a strong focus 
on ‘stability’ (Kuzio, 2015: 178). FG3-Вm added that he does neither like Reva’s 
leadership style, nor his lack of principles, but he cannot think of a better ‘master’ for 
this city. 
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• FG3-Вm: This person has only one principle: power and wallet. That’s all. [...] 
But I do not see any other person, who would be a suitable master. I mean, it could 
be much worse. 
 
The awareness of a peculiar mentality with the aforementioned priorities by many 
(though by far not all) people in this region can be identified as one factor, which 
contributed to the development of negative stereotypes about the Donbas in other 
regions of Ukraine. BFG1-Cf explained that people in the West of Ukraine often 
confront her with stereotypical accusations and generalisations, telling her that all 
people in the Donbas are ‘bandits, robbing and killing everyone with their Yanukovich‘. 
Such stereotyping seems to feed a common regional inferiority complex, to which 
people, at least in Bakhmut, tend to resist with a persistent strengthening of their local 
and regional identity. Regardless of the frustrating stereotypes BFG1-Cf is confronted 
with, she remains proud of her region, and emphasises the regional legacies of a ‘hard-
working miner‘s region‘ – a pillar of the local identity. She mentions a popular toast in 
the region epitomising the strength of this unique regional identity: ‚To peace, to us – 
and to Donbas‘.  
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5.1. Experience of Conflict in 2014 in Kramatorsk and Bakhmut 
This chapter compares the themes across the cases. I start with the analysis of informant 
replies on the different experiences of conflict. The different experiences in these two 
cities are presumed to have had an impact on different attitudes towards the following 
themes: the relation of research participants to the DNR, the current Ukrainian political 
elites which emerged from the Maidan revolution, the participant’s attitudes to Russia, 
politically and culturally, and the Ukrainian nationalising policy in the region.  
 
5.1.1. Experience of Conflict in 2014 – Kramatorsk under fire 
As illustrated before, Kramatorsk was severely affected by the armed conflict in 2014. 
This severity of experience was reflected in the emotional atmosphere during the focus 
groups. In the first group in Kramatorsk, a soldier acted as an emotional icebreaker 
sharing his experiences during this period. 
• KFG1-Вm: All, parents, and me… aaah, we just sat in the flat on Valerian6. There 
weren’t many comfortable things [during this time]. And on the next day [laughs 
uneasily], I continued drinking Valerian at work. Because I was seriously 
frightened by all this. […] I was riding every day to work on a bike through these 
separatist checkpoints… I just wanted to throw a grenade on them. 
While KFG1-Вm conveyed his thoughts and experiences, the other focus group 
participants seemed noticeably tense. KFG1-Af started crying. KFG1-Вm switched his 
seat to her and held her close, provided emotional support, while other participants 
continued reflecting on their thoughts and experiences. When KFG1-Af calmed down, 
she added her memories. 
• KFG1-Аf: At 7 o’ clock in the morning I woke up from an explosion instead of an 
alarm. They were bombing the neighbouring courtyard. It was a sound of 
something rolling, as if somebody was crushing crystal under my feet. […] 
Most participants in Kramatorsk had equally appalling experiences, however some 
managed to express themselves in a less emotional manner. The third and the fourth 
group seemed less emotionally involved during their narrations. They soberly illustrated 
stories out of their lives from this time. 
                                      
6 common tranquilliser in Ukraine and Russia 
 48 
• KFG3-Cf: We live in the very city centre, and it happened that very close to us, 300 
meters away, a missile fell. […] The first thought was just that, “shit, if they are 
already bombing the centre, so, that’s it. Then we are seriously at war.” 
• KFG3-Аm: When all this takeover happened, my friend was working in the 
Ukrainian army on a contract and his father joined the [DNR] militia. […] When 
they were shooting the airport [where the son served], they were calling each 
other, and somehow saving each other’s life. 
• FG4-Аf: […] At one or at two in the night were often shootings. We took this 
[emergency] suitcase [laughs uneasily], went down the stairs to the first floor and 
realised that there is no bomb shelter nearby. 
FG4-Вm was working for NKMZ (see 4.2.). They provided one of the best shelters in the cities. 
• FG4-Вm: I was only afraid to leave work. [...] I mean, we were leaving work at a 
particular time, for instance, at 4 or 5, depending on the department. And at this 
time the shooting started, missiles were falling not far from the exit doors […].  
The experience of conflict for the participants was period of life in a state of emergency. 
All of them experienced to different extents various war-related actions, personal loss 
and strong anxiety. A theme which naturally emerged as participants were reflected on 
their experiences was their stance on the DNR separatists and their supporters. The 
conflict-related stories in Kramatorsk stand in stark contrast to the experiences in 
Bakhmut.  
 
5.1.2. Experience of conflict in 2014 in Bakhmut – ‘in comparison to 
other cities, this was nothing’ 
As illustrated before, the conflict in Bakhmut, and struggle for power between local 
politicians and the DNR was strikingly different than in Kramatorsk. In line with the 
lack of military action in the city, people’s reflections on the conflict were far less 
personal or emotional. When participants in Kramatorsk shared detailed stories of 
suffering, most people in Bakhmut expressed themselves in more general terms; they 
reported the main events speaking in a news-like manner.  
• BFG2-Аm: Well, Artemivsk was lucky because we did not have any real military 
actions here. In comparison to cities like Horlivka, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk. We had 
one or two shootings over all the period, three or four victims. In comparison to 
other cities, Artemivsk was much luckier. 
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• BFG3-Вm: Not much happened from April to July 2014 in our city. The DNR tried 
to capture the military sector of the city. But they failed. Apart from this there were 
no remarkable events, from a military point of view. 
• BFG2-Аm: The only thing, yes, was the prosecutor's office […]. 
BFG2-Em (continues for FG2-Аm): But they shot only a bit [there]. In comparison 
to other cities, this was about nothing. If you compare… 
One girl from Bakhmut moved to the city of Donetsk for her studies. As she was 
moving between the two cities, she could directly compare the developments. 
• BFG1-Bf: I was studying in Donetsk at this time, at the national university. […] 
You can say that I was living in the centre of the events. Here [in Bakhmut] it was 
very different to there. You could not hear shootings that often. 
Nonetheless, experiences of violence, anxiety during that conflict and shelling remain 
individual. People reacted strikingly differently to the situation, even in the city, in 
which everyone agreed that it was largely spared from as serious clashes as in 
Kramatorsk. 
The reactions depended, firstly, on which area of the city the participants lived in. 
FG1-Cf, for example, lived close to the military settlement in Bakhmut, a district called 
military town. As FG3-Вm said, in spring 2014 it was the main heavily contested area 
in the city. Her perception, thus, differs from many other the focus group participants – 
and comes closer to the experience of most of the participants in Kramatorsk. 
• BFG1-Cf: […] Several times they tried to capture the military part and I remember 
when we were waking up, at 3 am, at 4 am, from that the [picture] frames were 
trembling. We ran out, all neighbours, to a bunker, and when it happened for the 
first time we didn't even know what to do […]. Damn, I am 25, I could not imagine 
that I can distinguish weapons by the sound of them […]. 
Secondly, the media and information environment had a strong effect on the perception 
of the people. The disinformative media was used as a weapon of war (Kofman et al., 
2017: 13) and efficiently functioned. In both cities it caused anxiety and insecurity. 
Besides spreading distrust and alienating the population of the East of Ukraine from the 
government in Kyiv, the media campaigns by Russian state media or the DNR 
information channels were complemented by the spread of rumours in the cities. This 
contributed to a generally widespread feeling of anxiety [strakh] in the Donbas region, 
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exemplified by remarks of my informants in both cities.  
• BFG2-Em: At some point the media [Russian: SMI] just twisted the situation... 
which was not there. This affected the psyche, not only mine but also of all my 
surrounding friends and people. 
• BFG2-Хf: When the DNR was here, they were telling us terrible things about 
Ukraine. We were afraid that Ukraine arrived. They told us… 
BFG2-Сm: About Maidan, yes… 
FG2-Хf: … and they would kill us, and would shoot us all, and rape all of us. We 
were really afraid.  
BFG2-Em : Everyone wanted to obtain weapons. 
Thus, this media environment might have reinforced a negative relationship of the 
participants towards the political elites in Kyiv, regardless of the experience of conflict. 
The reflections of informants, however, indicate a strong level of awareness and 
differentiation on the topic of their own exposure to propaganda and disinformation. 
This is in line with current surveys, which indicate that both use and trust in Russian 
media in the government controlled Donetsk province is markedly shrinking since 2014 
(Internews Network, 2016).  
Regardless of their personal experience, all participants in Bakhmut unite their 
strong awareness that the conflict is still continuing in the surrounding cities. Still, the 
rather casual emotional climate particularly in BFG2 and BFG3, even when talking 
about such stirring topics as the experiences of conflict, was strikingly different to the 
tense situations, I observed in all four focus groups in Kramatorsk. 
This chapter illustrated the awareness of the focus group participants of the different 
experience of conflict in Bakhmut and Kramatorsk. While Kramatorsk was violently 
taken over by the separatists, followed by a roughly three months long violent control of 
the city, the situation in Bakhmut remained rather calm during the same period. 
Subjectively this difference played out in differing emotional climate within the focus 
groups, as well as different level of emotional involvement in sharing the stories in two 
cities. While in Kramatorsk, people illustrated their experience of conflict with 
shocking, detailed personal stories and sometimes even cried while recollecting, in 
Bakhmut, in many cases people gave rather general and detached accounts in a rather 
relaxed setting. Both cities were, however, strongly affected by a large disinformation 
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media campaign. While critically reflecting on the impact of media on their perception 
of events during the focus groups, my informants remembered, however, how strongly 
emotionally susceptible they have been to its effects in 2014. The following chapter 
compares the emergent themes and investigates differences in both cities. 
5.2. Stances towards the DNR – 2014  
‘Change! … our hearts demand. Change! … our eyes demand’ 
(Viktor Tsoi, song: ‘Khochu peremen’ 1989) 
 
The discussion of feelings or political stances towards the DNR emerged naturally in 
the very beginning of the discussions. While reflecting on the events of 2014, people 
mentioned who they sympathised with and how they were involved in developments in 
the city. I tried to dig deeper with further questions on personal alignments and general 
motivation of supporters in their city. By doing this I developed a comprehensive 
picture of the relation of my focus group participants towards the DNR. The outcome of 
these discussions is presented in the following section on the ‘stances towards the 
DNR’. The chapter starts by illustrating the various reasons why people supported the 
DNR. 
Firstly, in both cities dubious people were involved in business schemes related to 
the Party of Regions and, by this, provided jobs for many of the people in the whole 
Donbas region. One example illustrated in KFG3 was Viktor Pavlovych Pshonka, 
formerly a loyal associate of Viktor Yanukovych and, according to investigative 
journalists, a notorious underground figure in Kramatorsk (Carroll, 2014). Pshonka and 
Yanukovich closely cooperated with each other since 1990s, when Yanukovich was 
governor of the city of Donetsk (Byrne, 2010). Pshonka invested in factories in 
Kramatorsk and was thought of as Kramatorsk’s patron (Wilson, 2014: 126). According 
to KFG3-Am, ousting of Yanukovich meant a concrete loss of jobs for people working 
in businesses, owned or financed by figures dependant on Yanukovich’s political clan. 
KFG3 argued that this increased the support by working class people significantly, 
because they were particularly afraid that Yanukovich’s associates would withdraw 
their investments from the region leading to large scale job losses.  
• KFG3-Am: […] Before Maidan I was working for a jeweller and the master of 
various jewellers was a corporation of three jewellery factories. There was a guy 
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called Pshonka. Who was Pshonka? [rhetorical question] 
KFG3-Bm: General Prosecutor of Ukraine. 
KFG3-Am: General Prosecutor. And then Pshonka gets kicked out by Yanukovich 
out of Ukraine… […] and in fact 1000 people, roughly 1000 people from these 
three jewellery factories lose their jobs. What kind of relation should I have then to 
the activists of Maidan? Of course a negative one. 
As this snippet from a focus group illustrates, many people working for these businesses 
were either afraid of or directly affected by job or other kinds of economic losses during 
the Maidan revolution. Thus, they did not associate the ousting of the clientelistic Party 
of Regions from the parliament with a democratic turn of the country, but primarily 
with increasing economic insecurity.  
• BFG2-Е: It happened that [during the Maidan revolution], the US-Dollar went up, 
government in Kyiv took away our bread. Our business was dependant on the 
currency exchange rate to the US-Dollar. […] That’s why I had a negative relation 
[towards the new government]. 
• KFG3-Am: I was siding of course with the DNR. Why? Because, like, when West 
and Central Ukraine initiated Maidan, I lost my job. […] 
Secondly, as illustrated in chapters 4.2 and 4.3 the current stark investments in the 
development of the two analysed cities cannot detract people’s attention from the 
critical economic problems: high unemployment rates and poor living conditions of 
many people in this region. Elderly people, in particular, suffered already before the 
war. Disastrously low pensions and fairly low life expectancy fed nostalgic feelings 
about a perceived security in the Soviet Union. The average life expectancy of people in 
the west of the country was roughly five years higher than in the east of Ukraine 
(Guilford, 2014). For the marginalised people in Donbas, the post-Maidan elites 
represented ‘the other’ Central and Western Ukraine and thus were not trusted to tackle 
their personal needs – regardless of whether the Yanukovich government did it. 
Consequentially, the spreading propaganda by DNR and Russian information channels 
found a fruitful ground in people, who hoped to flee their miserable economic situation 
and felt inspired by the Russian land grab of Crimea, which many perceived as a 
successful integration of a neglected territory into a more prosperous country. 
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• KFG4-Вm: Wind of change. Our hearts demand change. I think, people were tired 
from their circumstances, and most people, those who live here… they just survive. 
I mean, they earn only money to pay for their utilities, to buy food. Maybe some 
minimal needs. […] Everything happened in the beginning on Crimea. And, well, 
at least what they showed, that everything turned out well there. […] And people 
were just hoping here that exactly the same will happen here, easy and painlessly. 
• BFG1-Cf: They started organizing a referendum, and a lot of people... they went to 
this referendum. And people voted, but... But I saw these people […], they had 
sparkling eyes... I mean what was the goal of the people? 
BFG1-Bf (adds): 'You will change something!' 
BFG1-Cf: They went with sparkling eyes, because 'yes, something will change! 
Everything will be better! Yes guys, we will start living! Now we will have the 
Donetska Narodna Respublika and everything will be great!' [...] 
The support of nostalgic elderly people, desiring for the comeback of supposed Soviet 
stability, was mentioned by my respondents in both cities. Overall, the informants 
distinguished between different generational motivations. 
• BFG1-Bf: I can add that those people, who were supporting DNR, who were going to 
the referendum, were either grandmas [babushki] [BFG1-Cf is affirmatively nodding 
heavily], who thought that they will get back to the Soviet Union. When they had 
stability and... now is Ukraine, where it is not clear what will be later. Not clear what 
kind of pensions they will get, and back then they knew: this is their job. And they work 
all their lives on it. Ukraine could stop paying their pensions at any moment. 
Thirdly, the generation of ‘parents’ of my participants, people in their 40s and 50s, were 
motivated by a feeling of economic imbalance between the Ukrainian regions. They 
were not necessarily involved in the dubious business schemes, and not necessarily 
worse off than people in other regions of Ukraine – but felt economically discriminated 
on the basis of a peculiar economic myth, which came up various times during the focus 
groups. According to this belief, the Donbas region is characterised as the ‘breadwinner’ 
of the country. 
• BFG-Bf: I mean people around 40 or 50. They were going [to vote in the 
referendum] for instance, because they thought that there will be a 
decentralization and they didn't understand why […] the money earned by Donbas 
is going to Kyiv and is not distributed back to us. Our streets are not developed. 
The people didn't see the money they earned for the state, why they are not used for 
that region. 
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• KFG2-Cm: I have a [relative involved in DNR], as I told you already, we were 
very close. […] And he was telling me that… [....] how they planned to develop the 
economy, well, I mean, while establishing DNR. […] And they said, their main 
goal is that all money stays in the Oblast. 
The Donbas indeed remained an economic heavyweight of Ukraine after the country 
gained independence in 1991. The coal deposit of the region is the basis of the 
Ukrainian energy. Steel is extracted in the region and remained, next to agricultural 
products, the main product of Ukrainian exports. The myth, however, that the Donbas is 
investing more into Kyiv than it gets back, cannot be confirmed numerically, it is rather 
the other way around. The year before the outbreak of the conflict, the Donbas region 
could only cover of 40 percent of its own needs (The Ukrainian Week, 2014).  
People like KFG2-Cm’s relative might have been part of the ideological supporters 
of DNR, who aimed to change the region for the better, fight social inequality and 
support ‘the ordinary people’. Being ideology-driven some of them hoped, similarly to 
Communist utopians, that they would redistribute wealth and assets. Others simply 
believed that they were fighting for a good cause.  
• KFG2-Cm: Of course, yes, they also stole cars, and robbed, but [...] they also 
helped people, […] distributed medicine, and food and vouchers7. 
• BFG2-Еm: They had, DNR had a strong feeling of fairness and for inequality. 
Firstly, they started dealing with those, who were dealing with drugs. […] At one 
point, they were thinking about social inequality, wanted to take from the poor… 
[interrupts] BFG2-Am: Take from the rich, give to the poor. 
BFG2-Еm: Yes, like Robin Hood somehow. At some point, something like two 
weeks [since they could place their flag], they tried to take something away from 
someone, to give something to someone. Something like that. That was basically all 
their political power. 
Igor: How did this work out? 
BFG2-Еm: Well, not at all. Nobody wanted to give anything. 
BFG2-Cm: No, wait. They did it by coercion. The one with the gun is always right 
[sarcasm]. In every kind of understanding, I mean. I have the machine gun, so I am 
                                      
7 The parcels KFG2-Cm was distributing with DNR rebels were funded by the local oligarch Rinat 
Akhmetov. Interestingly, plenty of the humanitarian aid people receive now in the conflict affected 
territories, are also funded by him. Besides his humanitarian aid on both sides of the contact line, 
Akhemtov is known to have funded both conflict sides in the beginning of 2014 (Kofmann et. al., 
2017: 61f.), allegedly similar to the mayor of Bakhmut. 
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right. I don’t have a machine gun, so I am not right. […] And you will not do 
anything against my machine gun. 
Lastly, focus group participants in both cities emphasised the involvement of 
different kinds of criminal elements in the DNR, which supported them in two ways. On 
the one hand, criminal elements were most ready to take guns and get involved in 
violent behaviour, particularly when they were paid or were earning money in other 
dubious ways. This is a common pattern observed in conflicts, such as the Yugoslavian 
dissolution wars or the genocidal war in Rwanda in the 1990s (Mueller, 2000). 
• BFG3-Bm: A lot of people joined just simply to rob. A lot of them were not good 
elements from the society, criminal elements among the DNR fighters. I mean, in 
the shadow of these events explicitly criminal elements decided to join the ranks of 
DNR.   
• KFG3-Am: I have some acquaintances, who sat in jail for a few years. I mean they 
sat for some kind of robbery. There were these people, who in principle… a normal 
person would be scared to go and kill or… but those, who are more inclined to 
banditry, they were brave enough to go there, and additionally they were also 
payed adequately. 
This section illustrated the various reasons why people in both cities sympathised with 
the DNR. Informants in both cities, with the exception of KFG2-Cm, remembered the 
DNR mostly with negative feelings of mistrust, disillusionment up to disgust. In sum, 
most of the reasons why people supported the DNR were of economic nature. One 
reason was the belief in a widespread economic myth characterising the region as the 
breadwinner of the country, which fed the despair of the many marginalised people in 
the region. These people, part of the constructed Donbas-based ‘Russian speaking 
minority’, did not trust the new emerging political elites in the capital enough to take a 
side against the DNR. These elites of the ‘nationalising state’ were met with rapidly 
increasing suspicion, when they introduced nationalising policies, such as the 
abolishment of the special status of the Russian language shortly after their political 
takeover. At the same time, ideology-driven individuals joined the ranks of the DNR, 
seeking to change the rampant social inequality in the region. Beyond that, various 
people, whose salary was directly tied to businesses run by associates of the Party of 
Regions, felt afraid to lose their jobs and, lastly, criminal elements used the unrests as a 
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lucrative opportunity. The next section analyses the reactions of my focus group 
participants to symbols of the DNR during the group talks. 
5.3. Feelings towards the DNR – 2017 
After initially depicting the similar relation of people in both cities towards the DNR in 
2014, in this section I evaluate the reactions of my focus group participants towards the 
symbol of the DNR. By this, I wanted to observe and investigate the feelings of 
‘ordinary people’ in the region and analyse whether there is a difference in the relation 
to the DNR between the two cities. The relation to DNR is relevant, when we think 
about the ‘nation as a discursive construct’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008), which emerges 
not only from daily interactions, but also from the reflection on what people do not want 
to identify with. The DNR represents in this logic a ‘significant other’ (Hall, 2003), an 
alternative model to Ukraine, which failed to put roots in the cities of Kramatorsk and 
Bakhmut. Hence, it can be presumed that people feel more negative about the DNR the 
more they experienced war-related activities. Logically it might stand out that the more 
negative people feel about the ‘other’ DNR, the more positive they feel about Ukraine. 
People in Kramatorsk were unease by the DNR symbols and expressed explicitly 
negative attitudes, in some cases these symbols evoked the memories of their horrifying 
personal war-related experiences from 2014. 
• KFG1-Вm: Take it away… simple, simple answer… take it away. 
KFG1-Cf: Take it away, please, yes. We cannot have a good relation to this. 
KFG1-Gf: Negative emotions, very much. 
• KFG3-Аm: This flag, I associate… an unfortunate project. A divorce. Divorce of 
Mr Putin [laughs uneasily]. Negative [feelings]… frustration. It causes a feeling, 
not negative, not positive, but.. […] Sadness. Disappointment. That such a stupid 
idea manifested is sad. 
Two focus group participants, mentioned, however, that they relate rather neutrally 
towards the symbol. One of them emphasised that running around with this flag might 
cause you plenty of trouble now.  
• KFG2-Dm: I don’t know, I like the combination of colours. Which association with 
that… the association is disputable. I don’t know… If you wear this in our city, 
then… you can quickly run into a lot of problems. In general I relate neutrally to 
this. 
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A couple of people in both cities mentioned, similarly to KFG2-Dm and the six elderly 
women in the field description in 4.2. that freedom of speech in their country declined. 
They had the feeling that people get blackmailed for opinions varying from a perceived 
‘patriotic’ mainstream. A group of NKMZ workers, which I joined for dinner, even 
asked me whether there was a ‘real freedom of speech’ in my country (Germany), 
pointing out that they perceived it differently in Ukraine right now. KFG3-Bm and 
KFG3-Am had a strikingly similar feeling of freedom of speech inhibition when I 
showed the Russian flag in their focus group: 
• KFG3-Вm: Unfortunately… Why did I say unfortunately [wonders about himself]? 
Fortunately or unfortunately this flag doesn’t hang anywhere here. Well I don’t 
know, it is forbidden. O, prohibition, yes, seriously. Probably, [I feel] somehow 
even scare. [...] I would be afraid, for instance, to wear a jacket with a Russian 
flag and walk out to the street. I am serious, I would be afraid. [...] No, not afraid 
from the side of the aggressor, oh lord. Because there are the same kind of people 
as we are […]. 
• KFG3-Аm: […] I know that this flag now is very… perceived aggressively because 
Russia is the aggressor state. This flag is forbidden. […]  
Two things can be said about the overall political atmosphere in the city. On the one 
hand, it can indicate an awareness of my informants that most people in Kramatorsk 
have strong pro-Ukrainian emotions and negative emotions towards the DNR. The 
informants might be afraid that these reactions might be shown to such extent, that 
people, if confronted with the DNR flag, could violently show their siding with 
Ukraine. On the other hand, it might show a feeling of political censorship. Informants 
might be afraid that police or secret services would arrest them for allegedly supporting 
the DNR. This would mean a rather tense and mistrustful relationship between 
individuals and the ‘nationalising state’ as well as individuals between each other. 
The DNR flag was shown to the groups after gathering their reaction towards the 
Ukrainian and Russian flag. Hence, some participants were comparing their emotions 
directly to the previous symbols. 
• KFG4-Вm: In comparison to the Ukrainian flag, this one is more negative. I mean 
it represents some kind of a threat. 
KFG2-Cm, whose relative was involved in the DNR, is an ostentatious exception. He 
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does not feel anything negative towards the DNR. His frustration about his current 
living circumstances, however, increased by the fact that he told me that he got 
blacklisted by the Ukrainian government because of his relative and retracted from an 
unconditional offer to study at a Ukrainian university. Such secondary results of the 
conflict, seem to impede the building a trustful relationship between the current 
political, ‘nationalising’ authorities in the capital and individuals in the Donbas region. 
In a striking difference to the reactions in Kramatorsk, most reactions towards the 
DNR symbols in Bakhmut were rather neutral. 
• BFG3-Вm: Let’s say, my attitude towards this is neutral. […] 
BFG3-Аm: My feelings are neutral. […] 
• FG2-Cm: Not really familiar. […] 
FG2-Em: Nothing, whatsoever it… 
FG2-Df: I don’t know, I have something… Is this the DNR one? I see blood somehow. I 
don’t know why. But somehow blood. Somehow. I don’t know. Because of war. These are 
my first impressions. 
FG2-Cm: Absolutely no feelings. It didn’t catch us strongly, we don’t understand it. You 
need to show this in other provinces [oblasts]. They can tell you more in detail. It [DNR 
flag] does not touch us at all. 
FG2-Bf: Absolutely nothing. [Seen it] Sometimes. Overall. 
FG2-Am: Indifference. 
In Bakhmut, BFG1-Cf and BFG1-Bf reacted most negatively towards it. As mentioned 
before, one lived close to the military settlement, which was severely contested in 2014, 
but successfully defended by the Ukrainian army. The other girl studied in Donetsk, 
where events developed strikingly differently and which is now the unrecognised capital 
of DNR. 
• FG1-Cf: [twitches with her eyebrows] Aggression. It causes aggression in me. I 
remember the negative emotions, which I felt when I saw particularly this flag with 
this symbol in my city. Because... it is shooting. It is... bad people. […] You go into 
a shop and next to you stands a soldier and pushes a machine gun into your back. 
You make a remark and he tells you not really nice things as a reply. This picture 
causes aggression in me. Aggression, discomfort and tension. In other words, I am 
sitting and it makes me feel tense. 
FG1-Bf: Yes, it is not a nice feeling. It just reminds me of the negative feelings as 
FG1-Cf said. […] Discomfort… 
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The different experience of the conflict by BFG1-Cf and BFG1-Bf in comparison to the 
other FG participants in Bakhmut might relate to their stronger and more negative 
stance towards the DNR symbols than of the other focus group participants in Bakhmut. 
While most of the informants related neutrally in this city, BFG1-Cf’s and BFG1-Bf’s 
associations stand out as similar to the reactions I observed in Kramatorsk. At least 
among my informants these patterns indicate a cautious confirmation of my first 
assumption: that the more extreme the individual experience of conflict-related clashes 
personally was, the less supportive are the focus group participants of DNR symbols 
and ideas. The focus groups in Kramatorsk show a generally weaker support for DNR 
than the groups in Bakhmut. Informants in both cities, however, indicated various levels 
of mistrust on two levels: the state-individual – between alleged ‘minority’ and 
‘nationalising state’ – and between individuals.  
The next section discusses the relation to another crucial significant ‘other’ in 
Ukraine. As illustrated in the historical background of the region, the borderland 
identity of the Donbas region was never fully loyal towards any ideology or 
government, neither towards Ukraine nor Russia (Kuromiya, 2015: 2). As the region is 
now violently torn between these countries since 2014, the next theme investigates: 
How did the conflict change the relationship of the informants towards Russia? 
 
5.4. Russia – ‘aggressor’ and ‘brother-nation’ 
Polegkyi distinguishes two types of narratives about Russia: post-imperial and post-
colonial. Echoes of both of these narratives were evident among the focus group 
participants. In the post-imperial narrative Ukraine is allegedly situated in the history of 
a ‘fraternal union’ with Russia. It is usually concomitant with feelings of nostalgia, 
glorifying the past and a supposed ‘brotherhood’ of nations in the Soviet Union. 
Adherents of this narrative usually contradict this idealised memory of ‘a simpler past’ 
to ‘a confusing or uncertain present’ (Polegky, 2015: 184). In stark contrast to the ‘post-
imperial’, the ‘post-colonial’ discourse envisages the ‘empire’ as the significant ‘other’ 
of the Ukrainian identity. 
This chapter compares the feelings of the focus group participants towards this 
alleged ‘significant other’ – politically, culturally, and language-wise. When it comes to 
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their feelings towards Russia, many people in the focus groups seemed to feel caught in 
a paradoxical situation. The paradoxical relationship became most evident in their 
reactions to the Russian flag, which turned out to be more controversially discussed in 
Kramatorsk than in Bakhmut.  
On the one hand, many participants in Kramatorsk were raised with relatives in 
Russia, the Russian language as their lingua franca and narratives portraying Russia as a 
close ‘brother-nation’ to which they and their families have a historic relationship.  
• KFG4-Аf: I don’t know what kind of thoughts I have. This is the Russian flag. We 
talk in Russian. [...] My grandma is from St. Petersburg, my great-grandma is from 
St. Petersburg. They moved here with my grandpa, to Kramatorsk. Kramatorsk is 
fully Russian speaking. […] If you take any person on the street and you ask him 
what roots does he or she have. Probably many have Russian roots, Ukrainian 
roots, we are all Slavic people. […] It does not cause any negative feelings... 
Russian… language, Russian flag. 
• KFG3-Аm: Here in Kramatorsk all my friends have Russian roots. 
KFG3-Dm: Not only yours, all have Russian roots. 
KFG3-Аm: Because this is a settled region. People went here, all my friends, 
family, my close ones – they all settled over from Russia. [...] 
The replies indicate that people internalised the previously illustrated (2.4.) borderland 
identity, with strong historical or family ties to both Russia and Ukraine. Their strong 
identification with Ukraine is evident in the use of pronouns, such as ‘our country’. 
On the other hand, in Kramatorsk most people associated the Russian flag with 
terms that have a rather negative connotation, such as ‘dictatorship’, [Russian president 
Vladimir] ‘Putin’, ‘aggression’ or the ongoing conflict in their region. 
• KFG4-Bm: I associate this flag a bit with the problems in our country. Because, 
after all, Russia has a clear influence on what is happening here. I mean, I do not 
have a negative feeling towards Russia in general, but towards the leadership, as 
all what is happening here does not happen without their interference.  
KFG4-Аf: That’s why I say: Show me a photo of Putin – I tell you, yes, he is an 
aggressor. Show me the flag of Russia – I tell you this is a brother-nation. 
• KFG1-Вm: The flag causes in me disgust. [...] The feeling that they ruined 
everything. Everything that we had before […] … that flag ruined everything. […] 
KFG1-Af: […] some kind of rejection, anger. Some kind of tension arises. […] 
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KFG1-Cf: For some reason, when I see this flag… I see immediately the face of 
Putin. That’s what I have… the next word – this is dictatorship. […]  
KFG1-Af: While I was listening to the others, another picture in my head emerged 
[…] that on the side of the ‘enemy’ – this is the term that appeared in my head – it 
is safer than here. At least they do not have war. You don’t live there on a 
tinderbox [porochovoi bochke]. 
KFG1-Af last quote illustrates the relevance of the conflict in her perception explicitly 
and ties it to the feelings of danger, fear and uncertainty. In the third focus group KFG3-
Аm explained that he felt indifferent towards the flag itself, but associated it with a 
former brotherly country. 
• KFG3-Аm: In principle, I feel indifferent. It is the flag of the neighbouring country 
[…], our brotherly country, formerly. 
Some mentioned their internal conflict, namely, that they feel pressured by the 
nationalising state to perceive Russia as the ‘aggressor state’ in the current conflict. In 
some cases – without any insinuation – people structured their arguments in opposition 
to negative attitudes: ‘I do not have any negative feelings’ or ‘I do not think this is an 
aggressor state’. The fact that these statements came up without neither me nor other 
participants insinuating the opposite before, indicates the strong awareness of the 
negative, dichotomising, official narrative by the ‘nationalising state’ towards Russia, 
the ‘external homeland’ – and a subliminal resilience of the people towards this 
narrative. This resilience might relate to the discrepancy between this imposed narrative 
and their internalised ambivalent borderland identity.  
• KFG4-Bm: […] They impose that Russia is an aggressor state. This causes... mh... 
a conflict. I mean a negative and a positive relation I mean... [pauses]. I think 
everything happens to push people to some kind of war, to aggression. 
• KFG2-Dm: I feel absolutely neutral about it. No negative feelings. 
KFG2-Сm, who did not feel negative about the DNR flag, was the only informant in 
Kramatorsk, who was really enthusiastic about Russia without confining it to any 
negative associations in the same context. He did however, emphasise out of the blue 
that he does not associate the flag with ‘militant people’, showing an awareness of 
prevalent discourses in his environment. As he mentioned, there could be no significant 
difference observed between the way he felt seeing the Ukrainian flag, what indicates 
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that he internalised the previously discussed borderland identity as well: 
• KFG2-Сm: I have the same relation to it [as to Ukraine]. I love Russia. So. It is an 
independent country, I have plenty of acquaintances over there. It is a cool 
country. Moscow in particular. This is strikingly cool. I love going there. So well, I 
have quite the same relationship to that flag like to Ukraine. […] But the 
Ukrainian flag, this is a flag, under which I grew up. And the Russian… this is… 
KFG2-Am: the neighbour… 
KFG2-Сm: ...Yes, for me, the flag of our neighbour. Not... of my enemy, or of an 
anyhow militant people, which are against me, but the flag of my friends. 
KFG2-Cm’s unreservedly positive stance towards Russia might relate to the peculiar 
involvement he had with the DNR, the pro-Russian separatists in 2014. Besides this, he 
told us that many of his friends moved from the DNR territories to Russia to study 
there. This might have increased his frustration about his politically motivated 
withdrawal from studying at a Ukrainian university. 
In focus group 2 a quarrel about the use of Russian and Ukrainian language in 
Donbas occurred: 
• KFG3-Am: […] I don’t like, for instance, that the Russian language is suppressed 
[here]. I cannot go the cinema and watch a movie in Russia. I don’t want to watch 
it in Ukrainian. […] 
KFG3-Cf: But why, I am wondering, by the way. Sorry, that I interrupted you… 
KFG3-Am: I was studying [in school], by the way, in Ukrainian... 
KFG3-Cf: I am always wondering, when people tell me this: I want to go to the 
cinema and watch a movie in Russian… […] I say, what do you mean by ‘I want?’ 
What kind of childish ‘wanting’ [khotelki] is this, not talking about the fact that 
you already understand this language. 
KFG3-Am: My language is Russian. I was studying in a Ukrainian class, I finished 
school in the Ukrainian language. 
KFG3-Cf: I understand that, but you live in Ukraine. 
KFG3-Am: So what that I live in Ukraine. Do we have one or two languages in 
Ukraine? 
KFG3-Cf: Well, currently one, that’s the point.  
KFG3-Am: Before, there were two. 
KFG3-Cf emphasised in this quarrel that Ukrainian nationalising policy and the spread 
of the Ukrainian language – often referred to under the term of ‘Ukrainisation’ – started 
long before the current conflict. Russian, however, had an official status in Ukraine and 
was under protection under the Yanukovich government. In February 2014, shortly after 
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the removal of Yanukovich as a president, the Ukrainian parliament abolished this 
special status again. Though the interim president Oleksandr Turchynov decided not to 
approve this law (Kofman et. al., 2017: 20), the discussion illustrates that the law added 
more wood to the fire in the East of Ukraine in 2014.  
In stark contrast to Kramatorsk, in Bakhmut most focus group participants seemed 
to be less torn between positive and negative feelings towards Russia. While seeing the 
flag the following reactions emerged: 
• BFG2-Еm: Good one [flag]. 
BFG2-Df: Powerful nation. 
[…] 
BFG2-Xf: Powerful, yes. 
BFG2-Df: Eh, it is worth being afraid of it, yes? I guess so. 
BFG2-Cm: Good streets, yes? 
BFG2-Df: Yes. 
BFG2-Cm: Immediate association. In comparison to our Ukrainian [streets] […], good 
roads, not so many soldiers, yes… laws are functioning. I mean, from the perspective of a 
car driver, yes. […]. That’s all I would say… well and our language. [...] 
BFG2-Am: Respect and some kind of… order. Order, yes. 
BFG2-Еm: Yes, I am also seeing, an order …  
 
BFG2-Am and BFG2-Em emphasised the association with ‘order’, what might imply 
that Ukraine is a country in ‘disorder’ in contrast to Russia. Additionally, they did not 
mention Russia as a source of this disorder, which was strongly evident in the quotes 
from Kramatorsk. Both informants in the last focus group in Bakhmut had no 
identification with Ukraine whatsoever. BFG3-Вm even used the pronoun ‘our’ for 
Russia instead of Ukraine. 
 
• BFG3-Вm: It triggers positive emotions. Well, I think that Russia – this is our 
native land. This is where my mom was born, my dad, my grandma. In fact, all my 
family is born in various regions of the Russian Federation. The culture here is 
fully Russian, the language Russian. 
BFG3-Am: My opinion is more positive than neutral. While it is neutral towards 




In the first focus group with the youngest participants in Bakhmut, people related 
mostly neutrally to Russia. They explained that they do not feel bothered by the Russian 
flag as nobody is ‘imposing’ it on them. Even BFG1-Cf, who showed the strongest 
reaction towards the DNR flag, did not show any stronger emotions towards Russia or 
the Russian flag though, similarly to the informants in Kramatorsk, informants 
intuitively polemised against an imagined dominant dichotomous narrative. 
• BFG1-Cf: This causes in me... indifference. I don't see anything aggressive in it. 
Nothing terrible. Yes, it is just the flag of the neighbouring country. They are just 
the same people. […] But there, they do not have painted pillars or houses [with 
their national flag]. And you won't see a flag on every balcony. [...] 
BFG1-Em8: For me it is the flag of the neighbouring state. I don't have any 
negative emotions, because nobody is imposing it on me. I don't see it anywhere. 
Various points can be distilled from this comparison. Firstly, it seems rather clear that 
the increasing relevance of the Ukrainian language in the Donbas region did not 
supersede the relevance of Russian, and seems unlikely to do so in the near future. The 
focus groups in Kramatorsk, however, related more ambiguously towards the Russian 
flag than the informants in Bakhmut. While emphasising that the flag itself does not 
always cause negative feelings, most participants in Kramatorsk immediately brought 
up the political dimension: Terms like ‘dictatorship’, ‘Putin’, or ‘aggression’ were 
mentioned, which is in line with results of current polls: According to the ZOiS study, 
88 percent of the respondents in the Ukrainian controlled Donbas do not trust the 
Russian president (Sasse, 2017: 13). In contrast to Kramatorsk, the flag and topic of 
Russia caused much less controversial discussions among the participants in Bakhmut, 
just referring to it as a ‘strong’ or ‘neighbouring’ nation, who they perceived as rather 
similar to theirs. 
While the discourses in the focus groups in Bakhmut can be identified as rather 
‘post-imperial’ (Polegky 2015), the controversial discussions in Kramatorsk are harder 
to categorise. Informants mixed yearning for political independence with a perception of 
                                      
8
 BFG1-Em was not from the selected cities, but from the settlement Kurdiumivka, roughly 19 kilometers 
away from Bakhmut. I kept BFG1-Em in the sample, to avoid getting mistrust by the other participants by 
excluding one of their friends and because I assumed that FG1-Em’s background might lead to 
comparisons in the group conversation. 
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a (formerly) ‘fraternal union’ between Ukraine and Russia. Thus, the analysis reveals 
that rather post-imperial narrative of most participants in Bakhmut is less shared among 
the informants in Kramatorsk. In regards of the general assumptions of the thesis, it can 
be tentatively confirmed that the stronger the experience of conflict personally the more 
critical are the focus group participants towards Russia politically. This does not 
necessarily lead to an increasing aversion of cultural distance towards Russia.  
Polegky illustrates that the more nationalist ‘post-colonial’ discourse – which 
epitomises the imperial ‘other’ as Russia – is more prevalent in the west and centre of 
the country. In summer 2017, when Ukraine and the European Union introduced a visa-
free regime in June 2017, current president Petro Poroshenko reproduced the ‘post-
colonial’ narrative in his speeches: 
 
‘We are separating finally from the Russian empire. The democratic Ukrainian world is 
leaving the authoritarian Russian world. Finally, we are independent from each other – 
politically, economically, in terms of energy – and mentally’ (Kellermann 2017, citing 
speech of Poroshenko). 
 
In this discourse, the negation of everything related to ‘empire’ is crucial for the 
construction of the (perceived Ukrainian) ‘self’ (Polegky, 2015: 174; Hall, 2003: 223). 
Russia is apprehended as ‘inherently despotic and expansionist’, an antithesis to 
‘European Ukraine with democratic traditions’ (Polegky, 2015: 183).  
Adherents of the ‘post-colonial identity’ do not typically perceive the borderland 
identity of people in the Donbas as an own identity, with its regional peculiarities and 
myths, but as another version of the significant ‘other’. These opposed discourses might 
be one reason why sociological surveys conducted by the Razumkov Centre in 2005 and 
2006 illustrated that Ukrainians in the east of the country tended to feel closer to 
Russians and Belarusians than to Ukrainians in the west of the country (Polegky, 2015: 
176f.). 
The stronger experience of conflict seems to have undermined the formerly 
prevailing post-imperial narrative in Kramatorsk noticeably stronger than in Bakhmut. 
Following Polegky, the absence of a collective memory in Ukraine, or a ‘shared past’ 
(Hall, 2003), might remain an obstacle in constructing a common ‘Ukrainian identity’ – 
at least in the sense the nationalising ‘core nation’ (Brubaker, 1995), represented by the 
current Ukrainian government under Petro Poroshenko seeks it. The next section 
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investigates how the current Ukrainian government or current political elites in the 
capital are perceived by my respondents in Kramatorsk and Bakhmut.  
5.5. Mistrust towards political elites and political activism 
As illustrated in the sections before, respondents in both cities seemed rather averse to 
the anti-government demonstrations on Kyiv‘s Maidan, that started at the end of 2013 
and culminated in the ousting of Viktor Yanukovich. This distaste seemed to relate to 
the following factors. Firstly, Yanukovich – as little as people liked him in Donbas – 
was perceived as kind of ‘their‘ man. His corrupt behaviour was perceived as natural for 
every figure within the political class, as mentioned in the instance of Reva. The notion 
of all politicians being intrinsically corrupt and detached from the ’ordinary 
people‘ resulted in a lack of hope in political change in general. My informants’ 
opinions towards political elites and activism reflected this scepticism and were similar 
in both cities, regardless of age, sex or educational background. 
• BFG3-Вm: In my opinion, Reva [mayor of Bakhmut] is the same kind of bribable 
politicians as all the others. 
• KFG4-Bf: And all this fighting [referring to the ongoing conflict in the east of 
Ukraine], I think is stupid and only about some political interests... something like 
that. 
• KFG4-Аf: Well, what I understood, is that all this war, the people [in Ukraine] 
themselves do not need it. In reality only the elites need it, to divide some kind of 
territory. 
• BFG2-Вf: Because none [no side in the conflict in 2014] of them is doing anything. 
They do not think about the people at all. No-one… 
BFG2-Сm: I agree. 
The last quote alludes to the second point of the argument explaining the distaste 
towards political elites: economic disillusionment. Having their own financial problems 
or the ubiquitous poverty in the region in mind, the informants in both cities do not 
believe that any politicians – neither on a local nor on a national level – pursue policies, 
which might positively affect their economic situation. Thus, as illustrated before, they 
did not associate the ousting of the corrupted Party of Regions from the parliament with 
a democratic turn of the country, but merely with increasing economic insecurity (5.2.). 
 67 
Thirdly, the mistrust in political elites seems to be accompanied by a general 
mistrust towards any kind of political activism. The rejection of political activism, such 
as the demonstrations on the Maidan in the end of 2013 and at the beginning of 2014, 
might relate to the previously discussed working-class heritage of this region. BFG2-
Cm and BFG2-Em were reproducing typical working-class stereotypes in the focus 
group about the ‘lazy students’ on Maidan, whose political activism for seizing political 
power is associated with, to put it with Willis, ‘unjustified authority’ (Willis 1977: 146). 
In the view of the focus group participants, the only legitimate political power can be 
provided by a ’patron’ or a ’master’, as illustrated with the example of Bakhmut’s 
current mayor Reva. 
• BFG2-Cm: I came home from work, turn on the TV, yes, they are people jumping, 
leaping on the Maidan. I think: Oh, very good that we don‘t have anything like this 
[in Artemivsk]. […] And you think, they would be better off going to work, instead 
of lazing around and freezing there. 
• BFG2-Em: According to statistics, who was standing at Euromaidan? Only 
ragamuffins [golodrantsy]. […] Who didn‘t have anything to do and who are 
incapable of doing anything. That‘s what I think. […] We were riding with the 
guys… 
BFG2-Cm: We were working, while everyone was jumping around.  
Willis provocatively describes this attitude as a division of people into those who are 
‘good with their hands‘ and those who ‘good with their heads‘ (Willis 1977: 146). In the 
perception of BFG2-Cm and BFG2-Em as much as in the world of the ‘lads’ in Willis’ 
study, students (involved in ‘mental work’) and the ‘manual work[ers]’ stand fiercely 
opposed to each other (ibid.). 
Younger participants in both cities, however, such as KFG1-Cf or BFG1-Cf, who 
reported stronger patriotic sentiments and had higher education, did not comment on the 
political developments on the Maidan, but seemed to be overall motivated to act 
politically and to foster the development of their region. 
• KFG1-Сf: I feel good, free, and want to work on making other people understand and 
feel the same way I do [about Ukraine]. 
Fourthly, in contrast to most respondents in Kramatorsk, respondents in Bakhmut 
brought up the topic of ‘law and order’ more often. According to Kuzio (2015), this 
 68 
used to be a common and relevant thread for the electorates in the whole Donbas region. 
In my sample, however, only older respondents in Bakhmut (between 25 and 30) 
mentioned this topos, while in Kramatorsk KFG3-Am blamed ‘West and Central 
Ukraine staging Maidan’ for the loss of his good job. 
• BFG2-Сm: I am just saying that we didn‘t want to have such a mess [besporyadok] 
in Artemivsk as in [Kyiv]. 
ZOiS researched the level of trust in political leaders and institutions as an indicator of 
‘political stability and regime legitimacy’ in the government controlled Donbas. The 
survey results indicate that over 87 percent in this region do not trust the Ukrainian 
president (Sasse, 2017: 12). Poroshenko, decided to actively promote the ‘post-colonial’ 
narrative, as illustrated above. Judging from the replies of my informants in the two 
cities, it seems highly improbable that this decision will boost trust in him, thus making 
it difficult for him to be perceived as a representative of the full country. Fomenting this 
discourse by his speech acts might rather confirm the perception of people in the 
Donbas that he is from the perceived ‘other’ – west and central Ukrainian clique. 
Polls indicate, however, that these ‘others’ in west and central Ukraine are not 
really fond of him either. Poroshenko is unpopular over the whole country for 
restraining democratic reforms in order to install his own ‘patronalistic regime’ in the 
country (Umland, 2017). At least some of my informants seem willing to challenge this 
political authority in the future. As some replies of my informants indicate, his political 
authority might be challenged by some civil society activists from the two cities 
analysed in this research. The patriotic sentiments, of informants like KFG1-Cf or 
BFG1-Cf can be derived from their stronger experience of conflict. The assumption that 
a stronger experience of conflict might increase the support of elites in the capital, 
cannot be confirmed by this research. The focus groups in Kramatorsk and Bakhmut 
seemed sceptical towards the elites in the same way. The patriotically minded young 
people among my informants, however, seemed to be more motivated to initiate their 
own ‘nationalising policies’ in their direct environment, regardless of support of elites 
in their region or in the capital.  
After revealing the general mistrust towards the political leadership in both cities, 
the last empirical section analyses how the ‘nationalising’ policies by the Ukrainian 
government and the general sentiments towards Ukraine differ among the focus group 
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participants in both cities. 
5.6. Love and ‘imposition’ – Nationalising policies in Kramatorsk 
and Bakhmut 
The last thematic analysis illustrates the different relation, sentiments and attitudes 
people in the focus groups had towards Ukraine and its nationalising policies. Ola 
Hniatuk describes a new peculiar type of identity emerging in Ukraine. This new 
identity is based less on linguistic or cultural factors, but on loyalty to the Ukrainian 
state (UCMC, 2017). This section tries to test Hniatuk’s inference by analysing the 
Ukrainian nationalising discourses in focus groups in Kramatorsk and, secondly, 
comparing them with Bakhmut. This section illustrates that the nationalising policies in 
the cultural and linguistic spheres have a stronger impact on my focus group 
participants in Kramatorsk than in Bakhmut. Roughly half of my informants in 
Kramatorsk confirmed that their patriotic feelings significantly grew with the beginning 
of the conflict in 2014 and that a rather patriotic mainstream emerged in their city. The 
same applies to my informants in Bakhmut with comparable experience of conflict in 
2014, such as BFG1-Bf and BFG1-Cf.  
As illustrated by the discussion between KFG3-Cf and KFG3-Am in chapter 5.4., 
the use of Ukrainian or Russian language remains a highly sensitive topic. KFG3-Am 
admitted, however, that by insisting on a right to use Russian in various contexts, he 
feels like an outsider in Kramatorsk. He explained on how the relation towards the 
Ukrainian language changed by most people in the city since 2014. The nationalising 
social pressure by the ‘ordinary people’ in his environment, seem ubiquitous: 
• KFG3-Аm: The Ukrainian language became almost ‘number one’, and next to it 
nothing should prevail. I know people, who used to talk and write in Russian and 
they flipped. They started writing in Ukrainian, try to talk in Ukrainian. For them, 
for many in our city, the Ukrainian language became a super-language.  
Confronted with the Ukrainian flag, KFG3-Аm emphasised that now he does not like 
‘his’ flag, though this had changed with the conflict. Differently from Russian-leaning 
informants in Bakhmut, KFG3-Am’s use of ‘his’ indicates a prevailing sense of 
belonging to the Ukrainian nation. However, he admitted that he stopped liking the 
Ukrainian colours, because they were overabundant– ‘at fences, [and] pillars’. 
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In many regards KFG1-Bm can be seen as KFG3-Аm’s antagonist. His way of 
speaking and gestures seem similar to KFG3-Аm; both seem to share an internalised 
working class habitus and consider Russian as their mother tongue. But KFG1-Bm 
patriotic feelings grew due to the conflict. Not only his reactions to the Ukrainian flag 
were remarkably positive. 
• KFG1-Вm: The feeling of patriotism arises…  A feeling of refreshment, freedom. I 
remember these shootings… it was simply a nightmare. In general, I associate red 
colours since then with blood and with their [DNR] flag. […] 
KFG1-Сf: The feeling of pride arises. A feeling of love. A feeling of the notion that 
I am a Ukrainian and this is my favourite country [liubimaia strana]. 
The same applies to my informants in Bakhmut with comparable experience in 2014, 
such as BFG1-Bf and BFG1-Cf.  
• BFG1-Cf: I became more secure with Ukrainian literature and vocabulary. I can 
read more Ukrainian. I think I even started thinking differently.  
KFG1-Gf, KFG1-Cf and KFG2-Аm mentioned that their schooling in Ukrainian 
contributed to their stronger connection to the language already before the conflict. 
• KFG2-Аm: Ukrainian flag. Our native flag. In this sense, since the childhood, 
Ukraine, Ukraine… Golden wheat, blue sky, from the bench from school times, 
from the Ukrainian language classes [Ukrainska mova] to Ukrainian literature…  
Though they were taught in Ukrainian already in school, the connection of KFG1-
Gf and KFG1-Cf to the language seemed to have increased since the beginning of the 
conflict, as for all in their focus group.  
KFG4-Af also emphasised her strong patriotic feelings. She was sceptical, 
however, towards all the ubiquitous nationalising trends in Kramatorsk, because she 
could not understand why people did not emphasise their love for Ukraine before 2014. 
In her view, painting the flag on the asphalt is not only pointless, but also disrespectful. 
BFG1-Cf and BFG1-Df, who were from Bakhmut but experienced the conflict in 2014 
more similarly to my informants in Kramatorsk, argued in the same way.  
• BFG1-Cf: [...] the flag is a symbol of the state... It is something sacred. A cultural 
value. But now we created something… hell knows what. 
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• KFG4-Аf: It is just… where was this patriotism before? The same people in 
Kramatorsk? Why weren’t you a patriot before 2014? […] A flag or a coat of arms 
painted on the asphalt – this is disrespectful. A flag must unfold in the sky, in the 
air. […] You mustn’t step on a flag. 
As part of the ongoing nationalising policies, the government increased the share of 
Ukrainian songs in the radio. All four focus group participants of KFG1 spoke about the 
increasing appeal of Ukrainian music and literature.  
• KFG1-Af: I was so surprised that there is ‘drum-n-base’ in Ukrainian language 
[…]. And it is really cool in Ukrainian […]. So well, it changed. Before the war, 
[…] Ukrainian was for me… a subject in school. It was necessary to read texts in 
Ukrainian. Now I read it with pleasure. […] … the same with the [Ukrainian] flag. 
It is home, native, warm. 
KFG4-А4 criticised the previous separation of students into Russian and Ukrainian 
classes. Instead, she suggested starting classes taught in Ukrainian from the 
kindergarten. 
• KFG4-Аf: … And not only with one group in the whole kindergarten studying 
Ukrainian, how it used to be, but all of them. The child will get used to Ukrainian 
speech from childhood. They will talk to their parents in Ukrainian and the parents 
will step-by-step get used to this speech as well. […] 
However similar efforts to reverse the former policies, which had buttressing the status 
of Russian, would be too abrupt and are perceived by many informants as an 
‘imposition’ [naviazanie]. This particular word ‘naviazanie’ was common in both cities 
when referring to the ubiquitous Ukrainian symbols across the cityscapes. Even 
patriotically-minded participants did not support the ubiquitous promotion campaign. In 
Bakhmut people criticised the ‘imposition’ of the Ukrainian symbols more often. 
• KFG4-Аf: But it is real that imposing causes the opposite effect. […] When it 
comes from the heart, it is great. When you only do this, to impose it on someone 
[…] than this will only push people away. 
• BFG1-Df: The only thing that I don't like is... as I said, I like the Ukrainian culture. 
I like its peculiarities and everything. But now, in our eastern region, they are 
imposing it strongly. You need to wear, to buy a vyshyvanka .[…] But a person 
needs to do this from his or her soul. 
In striking contrast to the trends in Kramatorsk, the rejection of Ukrainian 
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nationalising narratives as well as the aforementioned ‘imposition‘ of Ukrainian 
language and culture seemed stronger in the focus groups in Bakhmut. Those, who 
experienced the conflict in 2014 differently from the participants in Kramatorsk, did not 
mind the flag or the Ukrainian language per se, but neither identified with it strongly 
nor showed any understanding for the nationalising policies in their environment.  
The discussion in the second focus group in Bakhmut was mainly focused on their 
economic situation and a feeling that these policies cannot solve the perceived 
marginalisation of the region.  
• BFG2-Вf: [...] It is just unclear what this is all for. 
BFG2-Cm: Oh! You are right!  
BFG2-Вf: They changed the names, they changed the names of the streets, but 
nothing really changed. Life did not get better here. The salaries did not increase. 
Concerning Ukrainian language policies, the main argument here was that Ukraine had 
two national languages on an equal footing. In the perception of Bakhmut-based 
informants, the mother tongue and lingua franca simply depended on the region you 
were raised in. 
• BFG2-Am: This is the same as if I would go to Lviv now and force them to speak 
Russian. They are used to speak Ukrainian, they do not understand Russian 
anymore. 
As illustrated in this chapter, nationalising policies in the cultural and linguistic spheres 
seem to have a strong impact on my focus group participants in Kramatorsk. Roughly 
half of my informants in Kramatorsk confirmed that their patriotic feelings grew with 
the beginning of the conflict in 2014 and that a rather patriotic mainstream emerged in 
their city. Some informants illustrated how the Ukrainian part of their borderland 
identity felt threatened by the pro-Russian militias and activists. These people seem to 
welcome certain nationalising policies – such as the quota for Ukrainian music on the 
radio. The same applies to those participants in Bakhmut, who experienced the conflict 
as strongly as my informants in Kramatorsk. In line with the assumptions of this thesis, 
people in Kramatorsk seem to be more receptive to the ‘nationalising policies’ by the 
constructed Ukrainian ‘core nation’.  
The acceptance of the ‘nationalising’ trends seems higher, however, when 
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‘nationalising policies’ are not perceived as imposed by the state or the elites in the 
capital, but naturally emerging through the spread of music and literature or choices of 
‘ordinary people’. Regardless of their position towards Ukraine or Russia the 
overarching number of respondents in both cities criticized the distribution of symbols 
across their cities. These symbols were referred to as ‘imposed’ [naviazanye]. The 
criticism and resilience to ‘imposition’ by the nationalising state might indicate that the 
growth of national sentiments and spread of the Ukrainian language – are less triggered 
by the nationalising policies of the state, but by the personal experience of conflict. 
The majority of my participants in Bakhmut were simply puzzled about the purpose 
of government-promoted nationalising policies because it did not have any impact on 
their everyday economic difficulties.  
Therefore, the initially formulated assumption about the attitudes towards the 
spread of national symbols needs adjustment. More informants in Kramatorsk, seemed 
to be receptive for nationalising policies, such as the rising importance of the Ukrainian 
language in their environment and a stronger consumption of Ukrainian music and 
literature. While the connection to Russia culturally and politically seemed to shrink, 
Ukraine as a state seems to have successfully filled the gap of this former ‘external 
homeland’ or former ‘fraternal nation’ in Kramatorsk – yet the nationalising effort is 
met with mixed feelings. The majority of focus group participants in Bakhmut, in 
contrast, perceived the spread of the Ukrainian language simply as a puzzling obstacle. 
Ukraine’s regional and cultural diversity is characterised by different and coexistent 
narratives with their own peculiarities. The current elite-driven nationalising policies 
ignore and disregard these peculiarities. Therefore, the replies of my informants indicate 
that the intentions of these policies are mostly misunderstood and seem to fail in 
Bakhmut, a city largely spared by the violent clashes in 2014 and after. In contrast, the 
nationalising policies are putting down roots in Kramatorsk – however not because of 
their design, but because of a lasting attachment and stronger experience of violence 
under the control of DNR rebels.  
Hniatuk’s argument about the emergence of identity based on political loyalty 
needs adjustment (UCMC, 2017). The nationalising state Ukraine tries to actively 
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strengthen the loyalty of its citizens by different means and in different spheres, in order 
to diminish the influence of the ‘significant other’ – Russia – on its territory. These 
dynamics are also enforced by a new generation of people in Ukraine, raised in a 
different – neither Soviet nor Russian – reality (Matusova, 2017). These young 
‘ordinary people’, together with activists, artists or authors promote a new Ukrainian 
identity. The relation to the Ukrainian language in this process as an increasingly 
valuable ‘symbolic capital’ (Riabchuk, 2009) seems to be more relevant than Hniatuk 
assumes. Informants, particularly in Kramatorsk, illustrated how ‘ordinary people’ in 
the city exert a nationalising pressure towards each other. As KFG4-Аf suggested, 
people can get accustomed also without pressure to the Ukrainian language and culture 
step-by-step through the influence of beloved people in their environment, such as by 
their children, who get a full Ukrainian schooling, or by their close friends. Such a 
careful process might lead to a more positive relationship of people in Donbas with their 





The purpose of the current study was to examine the effects of conflict on attitudes and 
emotions of young people raised in independent Ukraine and living in the two cities of 
Kramatorsk and Bakhmut. The researcher applies a qualitative method, inspired by a 
most similar system design with a small n-case study. The two analysed cities are 
similarly sized, similarly industrially developed, with similar average income and 
similarly located in the government-controlled Ukrainian Donbas region – but 
experienced a different fate during the beginning of the ongoing armed conflict in the 
East of Ukraine. Although political legitimacy has been challenged by pro-Russian 
separatists and their supporters in both cities, the city of Kramatorsk was violently taken 
over by the separatists, followed by armed conflict and violent control lasting roughly 
three month. Kramatorsk became a base for the ‘hard power of guns and fighters’ 
(Wilson, 2014: 132) of the separatists between April and July 2014. In the meantime the 
situation in Bakhmut remained rather calm. Bakhmut’s mayor and local patron Aleksey 
Reva takes the credit for a successful mediation between government forces and the 
separatist fighters, which prevented overt violence.   
This thesis investigated whether the different experience of conflict of young 
inhabitants of these cities led to varying attitudes and emotions towards Ukraine and its 
nationalising policies, Ukrainian political elites in the capital, the separatist movement 
DNR and towards their political and cultural affiliations to Russia. The basis of my 
analysis were transcripts of seven focus groups, three in Bakhmut and four in 
Kramatorsk, which I conducted between 22nd April and 9th May 2017. Overall, I talked 
to 26 participants, conducted background interviews, and collected field notes. The age 
of my participants ranged between 16 and 34. 
Notwithstanding the relatively limited sample, this work adds valuable insights and 
thick analysis of people’s perceptions to the existing literature on the effect of armed 
conflicts and wars on identity. In the tradition of social constructivism, this research 
project examined how informants in both cities constructed their ‘multiple realities’ in a 
‘research interaction’ (Aronoff and Kubik, 2013: 26) with the researcher, as well as with 
each other. Envisioned within the constructivist paradigm, this thesis situated the 
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analysis of the field close to Brubaker‘s model of triadic nexus. In his seminal work 
Brubaker conceptualises the triangular relations between a ‘nationalising state’, a 
‘national minority’ and (imagined) external national ‘homelands’ (Brubaker, 1995: 
108). This thesis presumes that Ukrainians with Ukrainian mother tongue (though not 
necessarily the only mother tongue) across the country are the ‘core nation’, while the 
Russian speaking minority – or rather those, who speak Russian as their first mother 
tongue – are in the role of a constructed ‘national minority’, with Russia acting as an 
external ‘homeland state’.  
The choice to categorise the Russian speakers in the Donbas as ‘minority’ did not 
follow a political reasoning, but the logic of the beginning of the current armed conflict. 
Brubaker emphasises that the perception of an external ‘homeland’ does not necessarily 
need to be based on any family-based or real historical connection of the minority to 
this state. Thus, ’”Homeland” is a political, not an ethnographic category; homelands 
are constructed, not given’ (Brubaker, 1995: 110). To balance Brubaker’s elite-centred 
bias this research integrated Fox and Miller-Idriss’ (2008) concept of ‘everyday 
nationhood’, which focuses on how nationhood is ‘embodied, expressed and sometimes 
performed’ in the daily lives of […] the ‘ordinary people’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 
537-542). 
The first major finding was that informants in both cities, with the exception of a 
single case, remembered the DNR mostly with negative feelings of mistrust, 
disillusionment and sometimes disgust. However, the more extreme the individual 
experience of conflict-related clashes personally was, the less supportive seemed the 
focus group participants of DNR symbols and ideas. Thereby, the results of this study 
illustrate that the focus groups in Kramatorsk showed stronger negative attitudes 
towards the DNR and its symbols than the groups in Bakhmut.  
The second major finding concerns the political and cultural relationship with 
Russia. The discussions in the focus groups indicate that the stronger the experience of 
conflict personally was, the more critical the focus group participants were towards 
Russia politically. Confronted with the Russian flag, informants in Kramatorsk 
associated it more often with rather negative terms, such as ‘dictatorship’, usually in 
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connection with the name of [Russian president Vladimir] ‘Putin’, ‘aggression’ or the 
ongoing conflict in their region. In contrast, the flag and topic of Russia caused much 
less ambiguous reactions among the focus group participants in Bakhmut. They were 
referring to it just as a ‘strong’ or ‘neighbouring’ nation, which was rather similar to 
theirs.  
However, as the discussions also showed, a critical political stance on Russia does 
not necessarily include a feeling of cultural aversion towards Russia. The focus groups 
in both cities illustrated a strong borderland identity, with a connection to the Russian 
language, strong historical or family ties to both Russia and Ukraine. Russia was often 
referred to as a ‘brother nation’. In some cases – without any insinuation – people 
structured their arguments in opposition to russophobic attitudes: ‘I do not have any 
negative feelings’ or ‘I do not think this is an aggressor state’. The fact that these 
statements came up without insinuation of the opposite indicates the strong awareness 
of the negative, dichotomising, official narrative by the ‘nationalising state’ towards 
Russia, the ‘external homeland’ – and a subliminal resilience of the people towards this 
narrative.  
The penultimate result of this study is that the focus groups in both Kramatorsk and 
Bakhmut seemed similarly sceptical towards the elites in the capital. Thus, a stronger 
experience of armed conflict does not seem to increase the support of both local of 
national elites. The patriotically minded young people among my informants, however, 
seemed to be more inclined to initiate their own ‘nationalising policies’ in their direct 
environment, regardless of support of elites in their region or in the capital. 
This leads to the last major findings of this project. The focus group participants in 
Kramatorsk seemed to be more receptive to the nationalising policies by the 
representatives of the constructed Ukrainian ‘core nation’. More informants in 
Kramatorsk, seemed receptive to nationalising policies, such as the growing importance 
of the Ukrainian language and a stronger consumption of Ukrainian music and 
literature. While the connection to Russia culturally and politically seems to shrink, 
Ukraine as a state seems to successfully fill the gap of this former ‘external homeland’ 
in Kramatorsk. Roughly half of my informants in Kramatorsk confirmed that their 
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patriotic feelings grew with the beginning of the conflict in 2014 and reported that a 
rather patriotic mainstream emerged in their city.  
The acceptance of these ‘nationalising’ trends seems higher, however, when 
‘nationalising policies’ are not perceived as imposed by the state or the elites in the 
capital, but naturally emerging from the ‘ordinary people’ in their surroundings or 
through the increasing acceptance of Ukrainian music and literature. The vast majority 
of my informants in both cities – regardless of their patriotic feelings – criticised the 
overabundant promotion of national symbols. The ubiquitous Ukrainian national 
symbols were perceived as an ‘imposition’ [naviazanye]. The resilience to ‘imposition’ 
by the nationalising state might indicate that the growth of national feelings and spread 
of the Ukrainian language – are less triggered by the nationalising policies of the state, 
but by the personal experience of conflict. 
‘Where is Ukraine’s national awakening leading the country?’, asked the British 
journalist Dickinson in his article on the success of nationalising practices across the 
country. None of the informants in the present research stated that the success of 
nationalising policies could solve the overarching social, economic and political 
problems of the Ukrainian or Donbas society. It might, however, contribute to the 
development of a responsible civil society in a region, in which civil engagement was 
traditionally considered weak (Mangas, 2016). The emergence of this stronger civil 
society in the Donbas, might help to overcome the prevailing quarrels and stereotypes 
between the different regions of Ukraine – and eventually set the ground for a united 
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8. Appendix 1: Guiding questions for the focus groups 
 
• How did you perceive the events in your city from April 2014 until (roughly) 
July 2014? 
• With which side did you sympathise or support when the unrest started and 
why? 
o Follow-up question: Did the insurgents have support from the local 
civilian population? 
• How was the city governed during the control of the insurgents?  
• How did your live changed during and after these events? 
• Could you work/ coordinate projects during the time of the insurgent control? 
o Follow-up question: If yes, how and who did you approach from the side 
of the city?  
• What did the insurgents try to change in the city? Which symbols did they 
establish? 
• “Focusing” exercise (Bloor et. al., 2001: 43): 
What feelings and thoughts evoke seeing these flags and symbols? 
1) Ukrainian flag, 
2) Russian flag, 
3) Flag of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, 
4) Emblem of the Azov Bataillon, 
5) Flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [Ukraїns’ka Povstans’ka Armiia] 
• Did the importance of the Ukrainian language in your everyday life changed 
since the beginning of the war? 
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9. Appendix 2: Questionnaire for focus group participants 
Анонимный опрос демографических данных 
 
Информация, которая будет использованна в диссертации. анонимна. 
 
Пол:                   Мужской 
Женский 
N/A (предпочитаю не отвечать) 












Семейное положение:      не женат / не замужем 
        женат / замужем 
        разведен / разведена 
        гражданский брак 
 
Дети-иждивенцы:     да/нет 
 
Уровень образования:    начальное  
     среднее  
     среднее специальное 
     высшее 
 
Трудовой статус:     трудоустроенный 




Родители из Донетской или Луганской области? (да/нет) 
 
Возраст родителей:   Мать: 
Отец: 
 
Уровень образования родителей: 
 
Мать:  начальное                           Отец:  начальное  
                                     среднее                                                среднее 
                                     среднее специальное                          среднее специальное 
высшее                   высшее  
 




Имя исследователя: Игорь Мичник  Число, подпись исследователя:   
 
Участник        Число, подпись:  ___________________ 
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providing access of thesis to the public 
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validity of the copyright.  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Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of 
validity of the copyright.  
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4) I confirm that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe the 
intellectual property rights or rights arising from the Personal Data Protection 
Act.  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